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Abstract
The fast expansion of the mobile services market has propelled the growth of MVNOs
to reach an expected 7.4% of the global market and, even higher, 8.1% of the North
American market by 2022 (Research&Markets 2017), which reaches a total size of 90
billion US dollars. The growth of MVNOs, meanwhile, has complicated implications
for MNO market performance because of the fast industry clockspeed, under which
new mobile network technologies inevitably overlap with existing technologies (Tilson
and Lyytinen 2006). Adding MVNOs to the value chain allows MNOs to develop
proper growth strategies by exploring new technologies balanced against exploiting
existing and proven technologies (Lee et al. 2003, Chandrasekaran et al. 2012b, Mishra
et al. 2015). As the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) noted in their annual
report, “MVNOs often increase the range of services offered by the host facilitiesbased provider by targeting certain market segments, including segments previously
not served by the hosting” (FCC 2013, p.3739)
From the two essays that comprise this dissertation, the first essay aims to explain the impact of MVNOs with different ownership (i.e., branded and third-party
MVNOs) on the market expansion of their hosting MNOs under the context of overlapping generations of mobile technologies. The second essay estimates the customer
demand of MVNOs with different market positioning (i.e., discount and telecom
MVNOs) and how their interaction may differ across different generations of mobile
technologies. Research questions proposed in the essays are answered by econometric
analysis of dynamic propensity score matching and nested structural models on pro-
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prietary data collected from a research company specialized in the mobile network
industry.
We find that discount MVNOs help with the market expansion of their hosting
MNOs. From a dynamic perceptive, the effect of branded MVNOs diminishes over
time, while third-party MVNOs become stronger as the market matures. Though
benefit the market expansion, discount MVNOs may increase the price competition
in the market and hinder the customer conversion from pre-paid to post-paid. Luckily, such disturbances could be mitigated by the market differentiation of service
bundling brought by telecom MVNO. Moreover, the synergy between discount and
telecom MVNO is more prominent in advanced mobile technologies. Overall, our
finding suggests that, from a short-term market expansion perspective, if the focus
is to quickly seize the market share with new mobile technologies, branded MVNOs
are preferred. On the other hand, if the focus is to expand in a niche, mature market, delegating to third-party MVNOs may be more effective. On the other hand,
from a long-term market planning perspective, offering telecom MVNOs helps lock
in customers and reduce churn rates.
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Chapter 1
Delegation with Technology Migration: An
Empirical Analysis of Mobile Virtual Network
Operators
1.1

Introduction

In the telecommunication industry, mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) provide mobile services to end-users without owning spectrum and network infrastructures (Shin 2010). Cricket Wireless, for example, is an MVNO of AT&T, one of the
major mobile network operators (MNOs) in the United States, which had 24 MVNO
partners in 2019. MVNOs are introduced to target under-served niche markets (e.g.,
demographic groups) where customers tend to be more price-sensitive with low usage
needs (FCC 2013, p.3738). In fact, “mobile network operators are increasingly sharing the networks (with MVNOs) in order to lower costs, maintain profit margins and
focus on innovative services to meet shifting customer demands” (Clark et al. 2017,
p.1). In practice, managing MVNOs is challenged by rapid market expansion and
overlapping technologies. Market expansion depends on the market access capabilities of MVNOs and on the balance of overlapping technologies, both of which require
MVNOs to play critical but different roles in the value chain. This study aims to
address the effect of MVNOs on MNO market performance under overlapping generations of technologies and value chain governance.
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The fast expansion of the mobile services market has propelled the growth of
MVNOs to reach an expected 7.4% of the global market, and, even higher, 8.1% of
the North American market by 2022 (Research&Markets 2017). Figure 1.1 shows
the continuous growth in the past decades of MVNOs, which are expected to reach
a total size of 90 billion US dollars by 2022. The growth of MVNOs, meanwhile, has
complicated implications for MNO market performance because of the fast industry
clockspeed, under which new mobile network technologies inevitably overlap with
existing technologies (Tilson and Lyytinen 2006). The overlap is further highlighted
by the costly initial investments of new technologies, exemplified by the rollout of
5G technologies, which require continued capitalization of existing technologies such
as the mature 4G (Grijpink et al. 2018). Adding MVNOs to the value chain allows
MNOs to develop proper growth strategies by exploring new technologies balanced
against exploiting existing and proven technologies (Levinthal and March 1981, Lee
et al. 2003, Chandrasekaran et al. 2012a,b, Mishra et al. 2015). As the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) noted in their annual report, “MVNOs often
increase the range of services offered by the host facilities-base provider by targeting
certain market segments, including segments previously not served by the hosting”
(FCC 2013, p.3739)
The role of MVNOs is further complicated by the way they are governed in the
value chain: either with MNOs maintaining full ownership (i.e., branded MVNOs),
or with MVNOs assuming full ownership via delegation (i.e., third-party MVNOs)
(Rasheed 2012, Matin 2014). Branded MVNOs function as a subsidiary of their
MNOs, while third-party MVNOs are independent members who contract with MNOs
for bulk services in wholesale agreements (Lehikoinen et al. 2014). A branded MVNO
creates internal operational redundancy for the MNO in capitalizing the potential of
the new mobile technology (Lavie et al. 2011). A third-party MVNO lends the MNO
complementary resources, i.e., specialized expertise and capabilities, to target the new
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Figure 1.1 Global MVNO Market Size
by Region from 2012 to 2022
segments (Lavie et al. 2007, Hess and Rothaermel 2011, Mishra et al. 2015). Specifically, market-based complementary assets can take the forms of localized knowledge,
specialized expertise, and brand recognition (Camarán and De Miguel 2008), highlighted by a strong focus on niche segments (e.g., industrial, demographic, and geographical) (Varoutas et al. 2006, Jaspers et al. 2007). However, a third-party MVNO
and an MNO may have misaligned incentives and coordination issues that would increase risk exposure for the MNO (Narayanan et al. 2011, Mishra et al. 2015), whereas
a branded MVNO internalizes the risks under the full control of the MNO (Gibbons
2005, Arya et al. 2015).
For existing technology markets, consumers are increasingly attracted to specialized and personalized services, which creates opportunities for MVNOs to exploit
these saturated markets for residual value by leveraging their complementary resources (Telecom.com 2018). For new technology markets, MVNOs are involved to
target niche market segments that are complementary to MNOs, such as younger
adults with lower income, which allows MNOs to quickly seize markets without damaging their core value. The coexistence of multiple technologies means that MNOs are
exposed to high risks from investments in the construction of new infrastructure and
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spectrum with short life cycles, to which MNOs have to commit before the existing
technologies have finished their life cycles (Lincoln 2012, p.179). This is the situation
where MVNOs can leverage value by bringing network capacity into use faster, either
through internal network expansion or through external complementary resources
(Korhonen 2003, p.300). In such roles, MVNOs function as value chain members in
the exploitation and exploration of overlapping technologies in the expansion into
the niche and underserved market segments (Jaspers et al. 2007, Calvo-Porral and
Lévy-Mangin 2015).
However, a new member to the value chain, as in the case of third-party MVNOs,
brings not only complementary assets but also new risks because MNOs do not have
full control over such MVNOs (Garrido and Whalley 2013). Such risks are compounded by risks associated with new technologies (e.g., 3G) and could outweigh the
benefits of complementary resources, making MNOs vulnerable in the exploration of
these technologies (Mishra et al. 2015, Ahmad et al. 2019, Ploner and Saredi 2020).
As technologies migrate, therefore, the value chain governance desirable to achieve
ambidexterity between exploitation and exploration may shift — from one that favors ownership (e.g., a branded MVNO) based on the internalization of control with
lower risks, to another that favors delegation (e.g., a third-party MVNO) based on
complementary resources.
Prior research on MVNOs is scarce and the limited few focus on key success factors
of MVNOs and policies that impact MVNOs (Shin and Bartolacci 2007, Kim and
Seol 2007, Lee et al. 2008, Shin 2010, Corrocher and Lasio 2013). Further, previous
studies have extensively examined the exploitation and exploration activities of firms,
as well as the ambidexterity between the two (March 1991, Levinthal and March 1993,
O Reilly and Tushman 2004, Chandrasekaran et al. 2012a). The related literature,
however, has not examined the dynamic aspect of ambidexterity between exploitation
and exploration under migrating technologies, and more importantly, under different
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value chain governance. We address the following empirical question in the context
of mobile network value chains: should MNOs expand by delegating to MVNOs with
existing vs. new technologies?
To address this research question, we examine the interactions between different
generations of mobile network technologies (2g and 3G mobile network services) and
MVNOs with different governance settings (branded and third-party) in the mobile
network market. By using proprietary data, we design a quasi-experiment to analyze the impact of branded and third-party MVNOs on MNOs’ market performance
in the 2G and 3G markets. We first employ a sliding-window-adjusted differencein-differences model to test the treatment effect of branded and third-party MVNO
launches in the 2G and 3G markets, respectively. While informative, however, the results are static and limited to average treatment effect and cannot show the dynamism
of the treatment effect over time, which is critical with migrating technologies. As
our main analysis, therefore, we adopt dynamic propensity score matching (dPSM),
a more rigorous and appropriate methodology for our research question, with a customized matching process based on our context.
We find that, first, launching an MVNO, either branded or third-party, increases
the 2G market share of the hosting MNO. This indicates that MVNOs are an effective value chain design for MNOs to expand with existing technologies. Whether it
is the MNOs exercising their control with branded MVNOs, or leveraging complementary resources with third-party MVNOs, MVNOs facilitate market expansion via
exploitation of existing technologies. Interestingly, however, these positive effects follow asymmetric patterns over time. In fact, 2G market gains from branded MVNOs
diminish over time as the market matures, whereas those for third-party MVNOs
become stronger, highlighting the growing value of complementary resources as the
market matures. Second, and more importantly, launching an MVNO increases the
3G market share of an MNO only when the MVNO is branded. Delegation by yield-
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ing control to independent MVNOs, while effective in growing 2G market shares,
has no significant impact on an MNO’s 3G market share. This may be because the
compounded risks associated with independent MVNOs neutralize the benefits from
the complementary resources that third-party MVNOs contribute.
This study makes the following major contributions to the related literature. First,
we examine the dynamics of migrating technologies in the design of value chain governance. The extant literature suggests that value chain governance (e.g., delegation)
has a direct impact on the performance of value chain members, but the literature
has not addressed the dynamic effects of technologies on value chain design and performance (Lee and Whang 2002, Cachon and Lariviere 2005, Pierce 2012, Dukes
and Liu 2016, Lee and Tang 2018). Our research provides the first such causal evidence against the backdrop of the mobile network industry, which has been known
for its challenges from constant technological migration. Our causal results, the
technology-dependent effects of delegation on value chain performance, contribute to
the literature. Second, from the theoretical lens of exploitation and exploration of
technologies, we add to the literature by showing that the roles of complementary
resources and ambidexterity are subject to migrating technologies and value chain
governance. More specifically, the roles vary in significance and pattern depending
on the technologies (i.e., 2G vs. 3G) and value chain governance (i.e., branded vs.
third-party). Further, the asymmetric patterns persist but change over time when
technologies mature and demand stabilizes. Our identification of these new theoretical contingencies also contributes to the literature. Third, our research provides
valuable insight into a fast-changing industry, e.g., the mobile network industry, for
researchers, managers, and policymakers who are challenged to design and regulate
high-cost value chains with fast-changing technologies. Particularly, for example, the
emerging 5G technology platforms allow network slicing and greater customization
for the new generation of MVNOs (Grimaldo 2019). In response, managers may need
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to design a more flexible governance structure for MVNOs to take advantage of the
strengths of delegation and control in the value chain.

1.2

Mobile Technologies and MVNOs

Fast-changing technologies have changed the landscape of service industries. With
shorter life cycles, high fixed costs, and high uncertainty, these technologies impact
how service providers design their value chains to access and differentiate markets
(Christensen et al. 1998, Souza et al. 2004). In the case of the telecommunication
industry, the development of mobile network technology has accelerated over time
(Miranda and Lima 2013). For example, 2G technology was introduced 12 years
after 1G was introduced, but 3G technology took only 9 years after the launch of
2G. As a result, “telecommunication players are being forced to make high-stake
multi-billion investments, even when the previous generation technologies have not
generated desired returns” (Lincoln 2012, p.179). The overlapping of generations of
mobile technologies poses a significant challenge for MNOs to quickly seize the new
technology market while capitalizing on the remaining value from the market of existing technologies. Figure 1.2 shows the example of AT&T’s technology transformation
timeline. In particular, AT&T launched 2G services in 1996 and continued to offer
them until 2016, overlapping with 3G starting in 2004.
The overlap between 2G and 3G is unique and unprecedented in the following
aspects:
• Radical disruption. In the history of mobile network technologies, 1G was an
unmarred product without wide-spread commercialization, and 4G was largely
an improvement of data transmission. However, the transformation from 2G
to 3G was more fundamental in terms of the basic functionality of the mobile
technology: from voice-centric to data-centric services (Tilson and Lyytinen

7

Source: https://investors.att.com/news-and-events/news-releases/
Notes: AT&T had divestiture, merger, and acquisition in the history, which is not denoted in
the figure for simplicity.
∗ Though it will completely phase out in 2022, AT&T stopped taking new 3G customers in
June 2019.

Figure 1.2 Timeline of AT&T’s Mobile Network Technologies
2006, Ansari and Garud 2009). As a result, the launch of 3G created two
independent markets with 2G and 3G technologies.
• Substantial cost. Spectrum license auctions were widely introduced in the
distribution of 2G licenses, leading to substantial license fees for MNOs (e.g.,
in the European Union, 100 billion US dollars in total) (Tilson and Lyytinen
2006). Combined with the construction cost of base stations,1 the unprecedented upfront costs of 3G exposed the MNOs to great financial risks, further
motivating MNOs to quickly seize the 3G market share.
• Slow diffusion. The diffusion of 3G technology experienced an insufficient
supply of compatible handsets, consumer hesitation toward the new technology,
and other difficulties in its early stages (Fuentelsaz et al. 2008). Long after the
launch of 3G, 2G was still dominant as it generated steady revenues and cash
inflow for MNOs (Tilson and Lyytinen 2006), allowing MNOs to exploit the
residual value of the 2G market.
1

The total investment for rolling out 3G network in Europe was estimated to be 250 billion
Euros (Ansari and Garud 2009).
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Therefore, MNOs need to address two aspects of the overlapping 2G and 3G technologies: exploration in the 3G market and exploitation in the 2G market, based on
the typology proposed by He and Wong (2004), in which exploration refers to activities
aimed at entering a new product market, while exploitation refers to activities aimed
at improving an existing product market. MVNOs provide complementary assets
(e.g., market know-how, sales skills, and distribution systems) for MNOs to address
the issues of ambidexterity with overlapping technologies (Jaspers et al. 2007).
In doing so, MVNOs perform under the governance of the value chain, i.e., the
ownership of the MVNOs represented by branded and third-party MVNOs (Rasheed
2012, Matin 2014, Lehikoinen et al. 2014). Without owning physical infrastructure or
spectrum, the branded and third-party MVNOs complement their respective MNOs
with assets of varying degrees of control and risk exposure, because the MNOs maintain ownership of the former and delegate ownership to the latter. The differences
are shown in Figure 1.3 and, more formally, in the following definitions:
Branded MVNOs are subsidiaries of MNOs and operate under the MNO brands
(or are co-branded with the MNO). They are usually governed by a revenue-sharing
contract.

Third-party MVNOs are independent entities and obtain bulk service

from MNOs through wholesale agreements.
The importance of MVNOs has further increased upon the arrival of 5G technology. Knect365 (2018) recently released an extensive industry report based on a
survey collected from 500 telecommunication companies across the world. The results
suggest that 69% of respondents named the implementation of new technologies, especially 5G, as the most critical factor that would reshape the industry and its supply
chains. 5G not only offers faster speed, but it also allows network slicing and mini
networks, which will lower market entry barriers and enable greater customizability
for the new generation of MVNOs (Grimaldo 2019). For example, Sprint announced
a partnership with a few MVNOs in the preparation stage of its 5G launches in
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Notes: VAS – value-added services; Apps – applications; CRM – customer relationship management.

Figure 1.3 Ranges of control for Branded MVNO, Third-party MVNO, and MNO
select metropolitan areas in the U.S. (Fletcher 2019). Managing MNOs and their
value chains for the simultaneous pursuit of exploitation and exploration is increasingly a task of dynamic positioning rather than static alignment (Raisch et al. 2009).
Firms, in reaction to fast moving technologies, need to assess and adjust their governance structure based on this dynamic environment (Siggelkow and Levinthal 2003,
Westerman et al. 2006). The migration of technologies and coexistence of multiple
generations of technologies further complicate value chain design and governance.
This study, therefore, is highly timely and relevant.

1.3

Related Literature

Innovative technologies often entail substantial risks and threaten firms’ success and
survival Benner (2007). To protect against the risks, firms often seek complementary assets to maintain their competitive advantage (Rothaermel 2001). Specialized
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complementary assets (e.g., distribution channels and strong links to customers) are
particularly valuable in the commercialization of new technologies (Rothaermel and
Hill 2005), but the value can be contingent on the ownership of the complementary
assets in value chains (Arora and Ceccagnoli 2006, Teece 1986).
In value chains, delegation involves the transfer of decision rights from firms to
their partners (Aghion and Tirole 1997). On the one hand, delegation may allow
members of the value chain to better leverage complementary resources (Wu 2004).
For mobile networks, delegation may support a greater reach of niche market segments and a more efficient expansion (Villas-Boas 1998, Lee and Whang 2002). On
the other hand, the lack of control in such value chains could lead to difficulties in
coordination (Cachon 2003). The extant literature also finds that involving independent members could alleviate the time-inconsistency issue, where customers’ early
adoption is discouraged by anticipated further discount, and thus facilitate earlystage market expansions with innovative technologies (Desai et al. 2004, Ramanan
and Bhargava 2014). This stream of literature, however, assumes the homogeneity
of product technologies without considering overlapping generations of technologies.
We contribute to the literature by exploring value chain governance in the presence
of overlapping generations of technologies.
Further, managing overlapping technologies, existing and new, has theoretical
relevance to the literature on the exploration and exploitation of technologies. This
literature suggests that an appropriate balance between exploration and exploitation
(i.e., ambidexterity) improves firms’ survival and success (March 1991, Levinthal and
March 1993, O Reilly and Tushman 2004). To pursue ambidexterity, firms often seek
external alliances and leverage their complementary resources (Lavie et al. 2011),
or expand with internal structural differentiation dedicated to exploitation or exploration (Benner and Tushman 2003). Mishra et al. (2015) find that, though firms
may benefit from the complementary resources of their partners, such a benefit may

11

be exceeded by the risk caused by coordination in the exploration of new technology. However, Lavie et al. (2011) find that internal structural differentiation allows
firms to maintain control by creating operational redundancy. Exploration and exploitation, thus, may need different value chain governance structures (Gilbert 2005).
“Risk-taking” exploration is better supported by a governance structure that could
mitigate the risk, which favors internal structural differentiation (March 1991). Exploitation in a saturated market is more effective with a greater level of product
differentiation, which favors leveraging complementary external resources through
delegation (Benner and Tushman 2003, Jansen et al. 2009). As the external environment changes, firms adopt different governance structures to balance exploration and
exploitation of technologies (Siggelkow and Levinthal 2003). The fast changing environment therefore requires a dynamic approach in governance choices. In this study,
we examine value chain delegation with overlapping technologies from a dynamic lens
of exploration and exploitation.
Prior research has also focused on the key performance factors of MVNOs (Corrocher and Lasio 2013, Shin and Bartolacci 2007, Lee et al. 2008) and social welfare
effects of MVNOs for policy implications (Shin 2010, Kim and Seol 2007). The role
of technology, particularly the role of overlapping technologies, has not been studied
in the context of delegation in value chains. In this research, we focus on such issues
and aim to contribute to the related literature.

1.4

Data and Exploratory Analysis

In this study, we explore the impact of MVNO launches on MNO market shares
and how it varies with newer and existing technologies. We collect data of MVNO
launches and MNO market performance information from an independent research
company specializing in the telecommunication industry. In this section, we first
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describe the proprietary data and then present a difference-in-differences model as an
exploratory analysis.

1.4.1

Data Description

MVNO launch data. The dataset of MVNO launches is acquired as a panel of 60
quarters from 2000Q1 to 2014Q4. The data contain information including names of
MVNOs and their hosting MNOs (e.g., AT&T is the host of Cricket Wireless), launch
dates of MVNOs, and the relationship between MNOs and MVNOs (branded or thirdparty). Our data cover 347 discount MVNO launches across multiple continents
whose prices are lower than those of the MNOs. Discount MVNOs target markets
for future growth whose consumer willingness to pay is lower than that of MNOs
(ITUNews 2019).

Oceania

32
19
128

Africa 4

147

Americas
Asia

75
238
35
161

Europe

203
MVNO

MNO

Figure 1.4 Total Number of MNOs and MVNOs
by Continent
MNO market performance data. From the source, we obtained additional
market performance information for MNOs, including total revenue, total connections, 2G/3G market shares, and total market shares. This dataset contains the
quarterly market performance of MNOs from 178 countries ranging from 2000Q1 to
2015Q4. The MNOs in our sample are highly consistent with those on the list of the
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International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Figure 1.4 shows the distribution of
MNOs and MVNO launches across different continents.
Prior to our analysis, we clean and merge two raw datasets. For the MNO performance data, we disqualify 34 MNOs in the overseas territories that have been listed
as Non-Self-Governing Territories by the United Nations (e.g., U.S. Virgin Islands)
because including these MNOs may add complications to our causal inferences. Second, we keep MNOs in the countries that have at least three MNOs. Because we use
2G and 3G market shares as the performance measures of MNOs, MNOs in a country with too few operators tend to get extreme values of the market share. Third,
we exclude data in Oceania because most MVNOs are launched by Australian MNOs
while there are no other countries comparable in Oceania to serve in the control group.
The final merged sample includes 603 MNOs and 306 MVNO launches covering 60
quarters (2000Q1 to 2014Q4).

1.4.2

Exploratory Analysis

In this section, we conduct a sliding-window-adjusted difference-in-differences (DID)
model as an exploratory analysis. The purpose of this step is to estimate the average
impact of MVNO launches on MNO market shares.
We explain the identification of treatment and control groups by introducing the
key treatment indicators. We create two treatment indicators for launches of branded
(Branded) and third-party (T hirdp) MVNOs, respectively. Branded (T hirdp) is
coded as 1 for all MNOs that launch branded (third-party) MVNOs and 0 for all
MNOs that launched no MVNOs within our observed time range, regardless of the
ownership. The post-treatment indicator (Af ter) is coded as 1 for quarters after
an MVNO launch and 0 for quarters before an MVNO launch. Next, we introduce
the dependent variables in the DID model. Since our data cover as many as 178
countries across the world, using an absolute measure of MNO market performance
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would bias our results because market sizes differ largely between countries. Thus, we
employ two proportional measures, the market shares of 2G and 3G services (M S_2g
and M S_3g), as our dependent variables to measure the performance of MNOs in
the existing and new mobile network technology markets, respectively (Bayus and
Putsis Jr 1999). 2G and 3G market shares are calculated as:
Con_3git
Con_2git
and M S_3git = Pni
M S_2git = Pni
i=1 Con_2git
i=1 Con_3git

(1.1)

where Con_2git and Con_3git are the total number of subscribers on the 2G and 3G
mobile networks of MNO i at quarter t. Given MNO i operates in a country that has
a total number of ni MNOs,

Pni

i=1

Con_2git and

Pni

i=1

Con_3git represent the total

number of 2G and 3G subscribers in the country that MNO i is affiliated with. Using
market shares as the dependent variable would be inappropriate if a country has a
small number of MNOs because monopoly or oligarchy could result in the extreme
value of market shares. For this reason, we keep MNOs in the countries that have at
lease three MNOs. Following previous studies, we test alternative measures to correct
the potential bias caused by the “sum-to-one" property of market shares. The results
remain consistent with our main results (see Appendix A.2 for details). The DID
models we employ are:
M Sit = β0 +β1 Brandedi +β2 Af terit +β3 Brandedi ×Af terit +Z it Γ+M i +εit (1.2)
M Sit = β0 + β1 T hirdpi + β2 Af terit + β3 T hirdpi × Af terit + Z it Γ + M i + εit (1.3)
where i and t denote MNOs and time periods, respectively. M Sit is a vector that
includes 2G and 3G market shares of MNO i at quarter t. Brandedi and T hirdpi
are the binary variables that indicate if MNO i is treated. Af terit represents if time
period t is in the post-treatment period. We access the average treatment effect
through β3 , which is the estimated coefficient of Brandedi × Af terit and T hirdpi ×
Af tert . Z it is a vector of the control variables, which includes gross domestic product
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per capita (GDP P C), net market share addition (M SA_tot), and average revenue
per user (ARP U _tot). M i is a vector of MNO fixed effects, which includes MNOlevel dummies.
Given that this analysis is for exploration purposes, we keep details about control
variable constructions, matching to pair treated and control MNOs, validation of parallel trends, and sliding window adjustment in Appendix A.1. The estimation results
are shown in Table 1.1. We find that launching branded MVNOs has a significant
positive effect on both the 2G market share (β = 0.013, p < 0.05) and the 3G market
share (β = 0.062, p < 0.01) of the hosting MNOs. However, launching third-party
MVNOs has a significant positive effect on the 2G market share (β = 0.016, p < 0.001)
of the hosting MNOs yet no significant effect on the 3G market share.
Notice the DID method adopted here only measures the average treatment effect
across all MVNO launches in different years. However, we believe that a possible
trend in treatment effects exists, made visible as 2G and 3G technologies have become
widely adopted in the market. Thus, we employ a more appropriate methodology,
which quantifies the impact of MVNO launches for each year and therefore allows us
to capture changes in treatment effects over time.

1.5

Quasi-Experimental Design

To improve the rigor of the causal inference and, more importantly, identify trends
in treatment effects as technology matures and the market expands, we apply the
method of dynamic propensity score matching (dPSM). In this section, we first introduce the method and explain why it is a preferred methodology given our research
context. Then, we proceed to the construction and refinement of treatment and control groups. Finally, we elaborate on the matching procedure and measurement of
treatment effects in our dPSM design.
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Table 1.1 Exploratory Analysis: The Estimation Results from the Sliding-WindowAdjusted Difference-in-Differences Models

Dependent Variable
Independent Variables
After
Branded×After

Branded MVNO
Model 1
Model 2
MS_2g
MS_3g

Third-party MVNO
Model 3
Model 4
MS_2g
MS_3g

-0.015***
(0.004)
0.013*
(0.006)

-0.016***
(0.004)

-0.009
(0.011)

0.016***
(0.004)

-0.001
(0.011)

0.100
(0.485)
-0.409
(0.446)
0.536
(0.481)
0.413***
(0.014)
Y
220
0.998

3.142
(1.932)
-6.971***
(1.200)
1.902***
(1.200)
0.450***
(0.047)
Y
115
0.983

-0.084***
(0.016)
0.062**
(0.020)

Thirdp×After
Control Variables
GDPPC
ARPU_tot
MSA_tot
Constant
MNO Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

-0.217
(0.803)
1.162
(0.705)
-5.033**
(1.716)
0.324***
(0.026)
Y
371
0.985

9.235*
(4.331)
2.799
(3.437)
0.893
(0.755)
0.172
(0.144)
Y
211
0.960

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1. For the
presentation of the results, GDPPC are scaled by 10−6 ; ARPU_tot and MSA_tot are scaled by 10−3 . Note
the linear terms of treatment group indicators (Branded and T hirdp) are omitted due to the MNO level fixed
effects.

1.5.1

dPSM

The dPSM technique matches the treatment and control groups for each period to
dynamically capture the treatment effects over time. Meanwhile, it retains the advantage of DID, which mimics a quasi-experimental design and creates two comparable
groups with MVNO launches being the only difference (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985).
Specifically, in each period, we construct two groups through dPSM: a treatment
group of MNOs, who launch only one MVNO in a specified time window, and a
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control group of MNOs, who launch no MVNOs in the specified time window. The
pairing is based on their estimated propensity score, which represents the probability
of launching MVNOs in each period. In this study, we construct two samples for
branded and third-party MVNOs respectively, where the identification and matching
of treatment and control groups are managed separately.2 We then, within each
sample, compare the market share changes of treated MNOs with the matched control
MNOs in post-treatment periods to assess the impact of MVNO launches on the
performance of hosting MNOs. To explore the ownership implications of MVNOs in
markets with different degrees of maturity, we also discuss the treatment effects of
the branded and third-party samples in existing and new mobile technology markets.
The adoption of dPSM provides the following advantages: first, the traditional
DID method that we used to explore the data in Section 4.2 allows us to evaluate
the average treatment effect; however, we are unable to quantify treatment effects
over time. With dPSM, we can measure treatment effects for each period and access
the changes in the trend of the treatment effects as technologies mature. Second,
our sample size is relatively small because most countries have a limited number of
MNOs. dPSM performs better in small samples (Rishika and Ramaprasad 2019). By
using individual-level matching in each time period, dPSM grants a better matching
outcome and thus, a more rigorous evaluation of the treatment effects. dPSM has
recently been adopted and validated by research studying similar problems (Aral
et al. 2009, Aral and Van Alstyne 2011, Aral and Walker 2011, 2014, Bondonio and
Greenbaum 2018, Rishika and Ramaprasad 2019), and has been shown to be effective
to construct causal inferences in observational datasets.
2

In the matching algorithm of dPSM, subjects selected as controls in the previous periods are
removed from the candidate control group in future matching. Thus, by constructing two samples,
we are able to improve the quality of matching by slightly increasing the size of the candidate control
group over time. The estimation results using one sample are highly consistent with the results using
two samples.
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We now discuss identification and refinement of the treatment and candidate
control groups. Then, we show the details of the matching procedure, followed by
matching quality checks.

1.5.2

dPSM – Matching

We first elaborate identification and refinement of the treatment group and the candidate control group.
1. Identification of the treatment group. To identify the treatment group,
we use the following steps. We begin with a cleaned sample as described in Section
3.1, which contains 306 MNOs that have launched at least one MVNO during the
time period covered in this study. To maintain a consistent treatment level, we focus
on MNOs that launch only one MVNO in one period (our unit is a quarter-year).
For this reason, we exclude 126 MVNOs launched with other MVNOs in the same
period, which leaves us 50 MNOs in the treatment group of the branded sample
and 130 MNOs in the treatment group of the third-party sample. Then, we further
apply the restriction that treated MNOs cannot launch more than one MVNO in
neighboring periods (kt quarters). This is because if an MNO launches a second
MVNO in the post-treatment periods of the previous launch, it would be impossible
to completely disentangle the treatment effects of the two launches. In summary, the
treatment group consists of the MNOs that launch only one MVNO in a given launch
period and have no other MVNO launch records within a neighboring time window.
That window is defined as kt quarters before and after the launch period.
2. Identification of the candidate control group. To identify the candidate
control group for each treated MNO, we use the following steps. For the candidate
control group of a treated MNO, we first identify a set of MNOs that are in another
country in the same continent. Since we use 2G and 3G market shares to estimate
the treatment effects, an increase in the market share of an MNO would most likely
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lead to a decrease of the other MNOs’ market shares in the same market. Thus,
matching treated MNOs with control MNOs in other countries mitigates such zerosum situations. Second, countries in the same continent are expected to share similar
characteristics such as market competition, government regulations, consumer behavior, and many other factors. Thus, we apply the restriction that treated MNOs can
only be matched with control MNOs in the same continent to minimize the differences
between the two groups.
Next, we proceed to refine the candidate controls by removing MNOs that launch
MVNOs in the kc periods neighboring the treated MNO’s launch period t. If an MNO
in the candidate control group is treated in the pre- or post-treatment period, it would
be inappropriate to serve as a benchmark in the measurement of the treatment effects.
This refinement step ensures that MNOs in the candidate control group are untreated.
3. Dynamic matching with propensity score. To model the probability of
an MVNO launch, we first select matching variables for the estimation of the propensity score. We select several matching variables at the MNO-quarterly level, which
represent different characteristics of MNOs in the pre-treatment periods. Below, we
discuss the detailed measures of each matching variable.3
Total Connections (Con_tot) is the total number of subscriber identification module (SIM) cards registered on the mobile network, which is a proxy for the size of
an MNO. MNOs with similar numbers of subscribers are usually similar in size, and
are more likely to adopt the same strategies in market expansion, such as launching
MVNOs.
Total Market Share (M S_tot) is the ratio of connections of an MNO to the total
connections of the market, which is a proxy for an MNO’s general competitiveness
in the market. Specifically, higher market share represents greater competitiveness
and higher market power relative to other MNOs in the same market. Thus, MNOs
3

Alternative matching variables are tested in Section 5.3.
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with similar market shares will likely adopt similar expansion strategies with similar
probabilities to launch MVNOs. The total market share of MNO i at time period t
is calculated as M S_totit = (Con_totit )/(

Pni

i=1

Con_totit ), where Con_totit is the

total number of SIM cards registered on the mobile network of MNO i at time t and
ni is the number of MNOs in the market that contains MNO i. Thus,

Pni

i=1

Con_totit

represents the total number of subscribers registered to all ni MNOs.
2G Market Share (M S_2g) is the ratio of an MNO’s 2G connections to the total
2G market connections. In our data period, 2G was the mainstream market, where
the majority of MNOs had already adopted 2G for years prior to the beginning of
our observed period. Though some MNOs launched 3G, they were slowly replacing
2G. Thus, we use 2G market share as a proxy for the firm’s core competitiveness,
which captures MNO competitiveness in the major market. The 2G market share
calculation is provided in Section 4.2.
Total Market Penetration (M P _tot) is the ratio of an MNO’s subscribers to the
total population of the country, which captures not only the size of the MNO but
also the size of the market. The total market share of MNO i at time t is calculated
as M P _totit = Con_totit /P opit , where Con_totit is the total number of SIM cards
registered on the mobile network of MNO i at time t and P opit is the total population
of the Country j that MNO i operates in.
Pre-treatment Periods

t − kp − 1 t − kp

t−2

t−1

Post-treatment Periods

t

t+1

t+2

t + ke t + ke + 1

Quarters

MVNO Launch

Figure 1.5 Timeline in Dynamic Propensity Score Matching
After matching covariates are carefully selected, we proceed to the quarter-byquarter calculation of the propensity scores. Because an MNO could decide to launch
an MVNO at any time period, we treat all 60 quarters independently and estimate
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the propensity scores for each quarter (Sianesi 2004). The propensity score value represents the probability that an MNO would launch a branded or third-party MVNO,
which is estimated from a logistic regression model of the matching covariates we
selected earlier. Specifically, we identify all launch periods that have MVNO launch
records in our time range and use the average value of matching covariates in the
previous kp periods as the benchmark to estimate the propensity score. For example,
if an MVNO is launched in Quarter t, we consider the value of matching covariates
from Quarter t − kp + 1 to Quarter t and estimate logistic regression on the average
value of the interested quarters to estimate the propensity score. The logistic model
for MNO i to launch branded and third-party MVNOs at Quarter t is defined as:


1
P r T reatedi = 1
kp



t
X



X ik  = Φ 

k=t−kp +1

t
X



X ik β 

(1.4)

k=t−kp +1

where T reatedi is the treatment indicator of MNO i, which is Brandedi in the branded
sample and T hirdpi in the third-party sample. X ik is a vector of covariates of MNO
i at Quarter k, including total market share (M S_tot), 2G market share (M S_2g),
total number of connections (Con_tot), and total market penetration (M P _tot) of
MNO i at Quarter k, and

Pt

k=t−kp +1

X ik is a vector of average values of the matching

covariates in all of the previous periods (from Quarter t˘kp +1 to Quarter t). Once we
obtain the propensity scores for each period, we use nearest neighbor matching to pair
each treated MNO with an MNO in the candidate control group. The pairs between
treated and untreated MNOs are created to minimize the total sample distance in
propensity scores (Guo and Fraser 2015).
Following the three steps of the matching algorithm stated above, we want to
ensure that the treated and matched control MNOs are comparable in terms of their
likelihood to launch MVNOs in each period (Aral et al. 2009, Rishika and Ramaprasad
2019). In Figure 1.6, we demonstrate the matching algorithm by showing a step-bystep example of pairing a treated MNO with a comparable MNO in the candidate
control group.
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Notes: The text in the circle denotes each MNO’s name and the country abbreviation in parentheses. Thus, in the
Figure, an MNO named LMT in Latvia launched Orate, an MVNO, at Quarter 12 (2003Q1). To find a comparable
control MNO for LMT, we first exclude all MNOs outside of Europe, as well as the MNOs in Latvia. Setting kc = 6,
we identify three MNOs that have MVNO launch records from Quarter 6 to Quarter 18 and drop them from the
candidate control group. We then exclude MNOs in France, Italy, and Denmark due to inconsistent numbers of
MNOs in the market. Finally, for LMT and remaining MNOs in the candidate control group, we estimate the
propensity score based on the average value of the covariates from Quarter 8 to Quarter 11 (kp = 4). Based
on the proximity of estimated propensity scores, we pair an MNO named m:tel in Bosnia and Herzegovina as the
counterfactual to LMT. To measure the treatment effect, we compare the mean difference between the market shares
of the two MNOs.

Figure 1.6 Example of Matching a Pair of Control and Treated MNOs
1.5.3

dPSM – Measuring Treatment Effects

To estimate the treatment effect, we use 2G and 3G market shares as measures for
the performance of MNOs in existing and new technology markets, respectively. The
treatment effect is measured by the differences in the changes of 2G (3G) market
shares between treatment and control groups in ke quarters after launch. For each
quarter that has an MVNO launch, we calculate the first difference between preand post-treatment periods for each group. Then, we group MVNO launches based
on their launch periods and use the t-test to compare the second difference between
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the two groups year by year. We conduct the comparison on a yearly basis because
presenting the treatment effect in an aggregate fashion would allow a larger sample
size and reduce seasonal effects. It therefore projects a clear trend for the impact of
MVNO launches over time. The t-test statistic is calculated as:
m̄t − m̄c
t= r 

s2 n11 + n12

(1.5)

where m̄1 and m̄0 are the sample mean for the treatment and control groups, respectively, which are calculated as follows:




nτ
τ+k
τ
Xe
X
1 X

M Sit −
M Sit 
m̄ =
ke i=1 t=τ+1
t=τ−ke +1

(1.6)

where M Sit is the 2G or 3G market share (M S_2git or M S_3git ) of MNO i at year t.
nτ represents the total number of MNOs for the year of launch period τ. The sample
mean of treatment group (m̄t ) is measured by the difference between the average
market share of MNO i in pre-treatment periods [τ − ke + 1, τ] and post-treatment
periods [τ + 1, τ + ke ]. The corresponding sample mean of control group (m̄c ) is
calculated using the same method. We then run the t-test on the sample between
the two groups to quantify the treatment effect. The 95% confidence interval is
constructed by bootstrapping with 1,000 iterations (Austin and Small 2014).

1.6

Results

In this section, we discuss the dynamic propensity score matching (dPSM) results.
We start with the parameter selection and detailed matching processes, followed by
matching quality checks. In the end, we present the estimated treatment effects of
dPSM and further validate our results with robustness tests.

1.6.1

dPSM – Matching in our Setting

We present, in Figure 1.7, the step by step sample development process from our
matching and estimation algorithm to better explain the construction procedure of
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the treatment and control groups. In the rest of this section, we first select the
parameters in the estimation process. With the application of the parameters, we
then discuss the detailed dynamic matching process. Finally, we conduct quality
matching checks in the matched sample.

Notes: In the boxes, T denotes the treatment group, CC denotes the candidate control group before matching,
and C denotes the matched control group based on dynamic propensity score matching. *Because the candidate
control group is refined for each launch period, the number shown here is the illustration of MNOs launching
MVNOs in the first period.

Figure 1.7 The Process of the dPSM Design
In the first step of matching, we further refine the treatment group. We continue
with the branded and third-party sample identified in Section 4.2, which contains 50
and 130 MNOs in the treatment group, respectively. First, we set kt = 6 and remove
MNOs that launched more than one MVNO during the neighboring 6 quarters. We
choose kt to be 6 because we later use the average covariates value of 4 quarters after
the launch to measure the treatment effect. If kt is set to be equal to or less than 4,
the post-treatment period of an MVNO launch could overlap with the pre-treatment
period of another launch. Such overlaps would contaminate the causal inference.
We include 2 extra quarters as a buffer to further ensure that all treatment effects
of MVNO launches are clearly independent from each other. With this restriction,
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91 MVNO launches are further removed. The refined treatment group contains 33
MNOs in the branded sample and 56 in the third-party sample.4
In the second step of matching, we refine the candidate control group. For a
given treated MNO, We remove MNOs in other continents and MNOs in the same
country from the candidate control group in each launch period. Similar to kt , we
set kc = 6 and remove the MNOs from the candidate control group if they have an
MVNO launch in the neighboring 6 periods of the given launch period, regardless
of the governance of the MVNO in the launch. This process is conducted for each
launch period to ensure that the MNOs in the candidate control group are suitable
to be matched with the corresponding treated MNOs. For example, in Figure 1.6,
given that the MVNO is in Quarter 12, MNOs that have MVNO launch records
between Quarter 6 and Quarter 18 will be disqualified from the candidate control
group. Additionally, we also exclude the MNOs operating in a market that has other
MNO launches, closures, or mergers. Owning to the use of market share as the
dependent variable, the changes in the total number of MNOs in the market may
cause unintended surges or drops in the market share, which could contaminate the
measure of the treatment effects. Thus, we further remove all MNOs in the market
that has inconsistent total numbers of MNOs within the pre- and post-treatment
periods (from Quarter t − kp + 1 to Quarter t + ke ).
After applying the above matching restrictions, we construct two samples for
branded and third-party MVNOs. In the branded sample, the treatment group consists of 33 MNOs with MVNO launches. In the third-party sample, the treatment
group consists of 56 MNOs.5 The candidate control groups of the two samples are
4

Note that the reduction in the number of MVNO launches is due to differences in the number of
MVNO launches across countries. To mitigate this issue, we apply “same-region-only" restrictions in
the matching. As discussed in Section 4.2, MNOs in the same regions share common characteristics,
including the number of MVNO launches.
5
Note that the numbers of MNOs in the constructed treatment and control groups are different
from the exploratory analysis because we apply a more strict and rigorous matching algorithm.
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constructed for each period based on the corresponding treated MNOs in the same
periods. Figure 1.8 shows the comparison of the refined treatment and candidate
control groups for each launch period. From Figure 1.8, we can observe that the total
number of MNOs in the candidate control group is proportional to the number of
MNOs in the treatment group. An adequate size for the candidate control group in
each period is maintained to ensure appropriate dynamic matching in the next step.

Notes: The numbers in the gray box indicate the launch periods. Our data cover 60 quarters, starting from 2000Q1
to 2014Q4. For example, the first launch of an branded MVNO is in period 12 (i.e. 2004Q1). The numbers are not
consecutive because, in some time periods of our constructed sample, there is no MVNO launch record.

Figure 1.8 Constructed Sample Prior to Matching
In the third step of matching, we employ a propensity score estimation process
for the treated and remaining MNOs in the candidate control group. MNOs may
consider recent performance in the MVNO launching decision, and therefore we set
kp = 4 and consider the average value of matching covariates in the previous 4 periods
as the benchmark in the propensity score estimation for a given period. For example,
if MNO A launches its MVNO in Quarter 12, the covariates for that period will
be calculated as the average value of the covariates from Quarter 8 to Quarter 11.
Because dynamic propensity score matching requires the construction of treatment
and control groups for each time period, we estimate the logistic regression for each
period independently if any MNO launches an MVNO in the given period. The
logistic regression model used to estimate the propensity score of MNO i’s MVNO
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launch at Quarter t is defined as:
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(1.7)

where X ik is a vector of covariates of MNO i at Quarter k, which includes total market
share (M S_tot), 2G market share (M S_2g), total number of connections (Con_tot),
and total market penetration (M P _tot).

Pt

k=t−4

X ik is a vector of average values of

the matching covariates in the pre-treatment periods (from Quarter t − 4 to Quarter
t).
Once we obtain the estimated propensity scores, we use nearest neighbor matching (NN1) to construct the control group. Specifically, for each launch period, we
pair treated MNOs with MNOs in the candidate control group that have the closest propensity score. After matching, our final sample for branded MVNOs includes
33 treated MNOs with 33 paired control MNOs. The final sample for third-party
MVNOs includes 56 treated MNOs and 56 paired control MNOs. Our final sample
covers MNOs across continents and both developed and developing countries. To ensure matching quality, we further check for substantial differences between treatment
and control groups by testing the covariates balance in the pre-treatment period. We
test the differences between the two groups by propensity score plots and the matching bias estimation method proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). The results
suggest that our matching algorithm significantly reduces the bias between treatment
and control groups (see Appendix A.3).

1.6.2

dPSM – Measuring the Treatment Effect in Our Setting

After constructing the treatment and control groups, we estimate the treatment effects
by comparing the difference between the two groups. Specifically, we set ke to be 4 and
utilize the average market share of 4 quarters after the MVNO launches to access the
treatment effect. We use this setting because we believe that an MVNO launch tends
to be a short term shock. First, the niche market segments targeted by the MVNO are
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usually smaller in size, which allows faster gains in market share. Second, following
the MVNO launch, competitors in the same market may follow suit and neutralize the
market share changes over a longer term. While applying the control variables used
in the explorative analysis, we further control for the total number of MNOs in the
market (T otalM N O) and total population of the country (P opulation) to mitigate
market heterogeneity. In the following, we discuss the estimated treatment effects on
2G and 3G markets, and connect these results to those from the DID models.
To assess the treatment effect, we compare the 2G and 3G market shares between
the treated and matched control groups. In Figure 1.9, Panels (a) and (b) show the
estimated treatment effects of branded MVNO launches on the 2G and 3G market
shares of the hosting MNO, respectively. Similarly, Panels (c) and (d) show the
estimated treatment effects of third-party MVNO launches. We discuss the estimated
treatment effects of branded/third-party MVNO launches on 2G/3G market shares
respectively of the hosting MNO, through the corresponding panels in Figure 1.9.
Branded and Third-party MVNOs in the 2G Market. Figure 1.9 Panel (a)
shows the treatment effect of launching branded MVNOs on the 2G market shares
of the hosting MNOs. We find that, over the period of 15 years, the average mean
difference in 2G market shares between the treatment group of branded MVNOs and
the matched control group is 0.550% (p < 0.01). The estimated treatment effects are
significantly above zero as the market maturity increases. Figure 1.9 Panel (c) shows
the treatment effect of launching third-party MVNOs. The average difference in 2G
market shares between MNOs that launch third-party MVNOs and the matched counterfactual control MNOs is 0.253% (p < 0.001). A closer look, however, reveals that
the estimated treatment effects of third-party MVNOs are asymmetrical to branded
MVNOs. Though the first two years are negative or insignificant, the treatment effects of third-party MVNO launches are significantly greater than zero and show an
upward-moving pattern over the years. On the other hand, the estimated treatment
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Notes. Panel (a): The estimated treatment effects of branded MVNO launches on the 2G market share of the hosting
MNOs. This figure shows the mean difference in the 2G market share between the treatment group (MNOs who
launch branded MVNOs) and the matched control group. Panel (b): The estimated treatment effects of branded
MVNO launches on the 2G market share of the hosting MNOs. This figure shows the mean difference in the 2G
market share between the treatment group (MNOs who launch branded MVNOs) and the matched control group.
Panel (c): The estimated treatment effects of third-party MVNO launches on the 2G market share of the hosting
MNOs. This figure shows the mean difference in the 2G market share between the treatment group (MNOs who
launch third-party MVNOs) and the matched control group. Panel (d): The estimated treatment effects of thirdparty MVNO launches on the 3G market share of the hosting MNOs. This figure shows the mean difference in the
3G market share between the treatment group (MNOs who launch third-party MVNOs) and the matched control
group. To construct the 95% confidence intervals, we use bootstrapping with 1,000 replications.

Figure 1.9 Treatment Effects of Branded MVNO Launch and Third-party MVNO
Launch after Dynamic Propensity Score Matching (2G/3G Market Shares of Treatment Group – 2G/3G Market Shares of Control Group)
effects of launching branded MVNOs are positive and significant at the beginning
but decrease over time. The increasing trend of third-party MVNOs and decreasing
trend of branded MVNOs are statistically significant in the slope test (see Appendix
A.6 for details). This is because, as markets get saturated, product differentiation
becomes increasingly important for MNOs’ market expansion, which can be achieved
by leveraging the complementary resources from third-party MVNOs. We conclude

30

that with launching branded and third-party MVNOs, both increase the 2G market
shares of hosting MNOs, but they differ in market maturity. Assisted by the method
of dynamic propensity score matching, we discover that the positive effect of branded
MVNO launches has a clear decreasing pattern, while that of third-party MVNO
launches has a clear increasing pattern.
Branded and Third-party MVNOs in the 3G Market. Figure 1.9 Panel
(b) shows the treatment effect of branded MVNO launches on the 3G market shares
of the hosting MNOs. The average yearly difference in 3G market shares between
treated and matched control MNOs is 7.033% (p < 0.05). Additionally, the estimated
treatment effects for each year are mostly significantly greater than zero, and we also
observe a decreasing trend of such positive treatment effects as the market matures
over time. The decreasing trend is significant at 95% in the slope test (see Appendix
A.6 for details). This may be because launching branded MVNOs accelerates MNOs’
expansion into new market segments with a firm control, but the deficiency in product differentiation is exposed in long term growth. Finally, we find no significant
treatment effect of third-party MVNO launches on the 3G market shares of the hosting MNOs. The results are shown in Figure 1.9. In Panel (d), MNOs undertake the
risk from exploring the new technology, as well as the risk from the adoption of the
third-party MVNOs. The aggregation of the risks prevails over the benefit of complementary assets and thus may adversely affect the market expansion of the MNOs
in the newer technology market. Additionally, due to the insignificant results and
rarity of the 3G launch event in the third-party MVNO sample, though theorized
accordingly, we do not make causal inference from this combination.
To summarize, in the mature 2G market, we find that launching branded or
third-party MVNOs increases the market share of the hosting MNOs. By applying
the method of dynamic propensity score matching (dPSM), we find that the positive
effects of these two types of MVNO launches are not the same. Specifically, we find
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that, in the 2G market, the impact of branded MVNO launches decreases over time
as the market matures, while the impact of third-party MVNO launches increases
over time. Unlike 2G technology, 3G is a new generation of mobile technology during
the time of this study. For the 3G market, we find that branded MVNO launches
increase the market share of the hosting MNOs, and such increases diminish as the
market matures over time. On the other hand, the treatment effect of third-party
MVNO launches is not significant. Overall, our main findings through dPSM are
consistent with our exploratory DID analysis. Using dPSM, we further explore the
variation of the treatment effects as technologies become mature and investigate the
nuance between the role of branded and third-party MVNOs. Our main findings are
summarized in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2 Summary of Results
2G Market
(Mature)

3G Market
(New)

Branded MVNO
Launches

Positive
Decreasing Trend

Positive
Decreasing Trend

Third-party MVNO
Launches

Positive
Increasing Trend

—

Technology
Governance

1.6.3

Robustness Tests

We conduct several additional analyses to ensure that our estimated treatment effects
from the dPSM analysis are robust. First, we test them using the Stable Unit Treatment Values Assumption (SUTVA), including covariates balance, parallel trends, and
reverse causality. Second, we redefine the treatment and candidate control groups by
setting more rigorous selection windows (kt and kc ). Third, to validate the robustness
of our matching process, we test an alternative set of matching variables. Additionally,
we set a different matching window (kp ) and specify different numbers using nearest
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neighbor matching. Fourth, to test the validity of the estimation of the treatment
effects, we apply a different post-treatment window (ke ).
SUTVA. To ensure matching quality, we first check the covariates balance between the treatment group and the matched control group. The results suggest
that there is no statistically significant difference between the two groups (see Appendix A.4.1). Additionally, following Autor (2003), Dhanorkar (2019), and Chu
et al. (2021), we test the parallel-trend assumption by estimating the treatment effects period by period. The estimated coefficient of the “leads” (i.e., quarters in the
pre-treatment periods) are insignificant, which suggests that there is no significant
difference between the treatment and control groups identified in each quarter of the
pre-treatment periods (see Appendix A.4.2). Lastly, we test the Cox proportional
hazard models and lag models (Dhanorkar 2019), from which we find no evidence of
reverse causality (see Appendix A.4.3 for details).
Identification Strategy. To validate the construction of the treatment and
control groups, we apply an alternative set of selection window parameters to redefine
the treatment and control groups. In our main analysis, if the gap between two
MVNO launches is set to be less than six periods, we exclude both launches from the
treatment group (kt =6). We apply a more rigorous condition by setting a longer gap
window (kt = 8), where we are able to better avoid violating SUTVA. The results
are highly consistent with our main results (see Figure A.3 of the online appendix).
Furthermore, for the construction of the candidate control group, we similarly apply
a more rigorous condition by setting a longer gap window (kc = 8). Again, the results
show high consistency with our main results (see Figure A.3 of the online appendix).
Propensity Score Matching. Next, we check the robustness of the propensity
score matching process. We first use an alternative set of matching variables. Specifically, we use net market share addition as an alternative to total market share to
capture the competency and market power of MNOs, which is measured by the ratio
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of new connection additions of an MNO to the total number of new connection additions in the market. Additionally, we use GDP as an alternative to the total number
of connections to capture the market size of a country. The results after applying the
alternative matching variables remain qualitatively consistent (see Figure A.4 of the
online appendix). Second, in our main analysis, we use the average value of all matching variables of 4 previous periods to estimate the propensity score in each period.
However, though recent performance is likely to weigh more in an MNO’s decision to
launch MVNOs, it is possible that MNOs could consider their performance further
back. Thus, we test an alternative dPSM algorithm that uses an extended window
to construct matching covariates (kp = 6). We find that our main results remain
qualitatively consistent with this longer window of matching covariates (see Figure
A.4 of the online appendix). Last, we use one nearest neighbor matching (NN1) in
our main analysis. In the matching process, we match the treated MNOs with control
MNOs that have the closest propensity score at each quarter. We also test two and
three nearest neighbor matching (NN2 and NN3) and find that our main results are
still robust (see Figure A.5 of the online appendix).
Measurement of Treatment Effect. After MNOs in the treatment group
are paired with comparable control MNOs, we use the 4 following quarters after a
launch as the post-treatment periods and conduct t-tests to compare the difference
in the 2G and 3G market shares between the two groups. Though we found positive
treatment effects, it is also possible that the MVNO launch may have a different
impact on the MNO in the long run. Thus, we apply a longer window to measure
the performance change after the MVNO launch (ke = 6 and ke = 8). To do so, we
conduct t-tests by using an average of the 2G and 3G market shares calculated by
an extended post-launch time range and find that our main results are robust to the
extended performance measure window up to 8 periods (see Figure A.6 of the online
appendix).
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1.7

Discussion and Conclusion

In this study, we explore how introducing MVNOs impacts the hosting MNO’s market
performance with overlapping generations of technologies. We further study the role
of technologies in MVNO launches under different value chain governance (i.e., value
chains with branded and third-party MVNOs). With branded MVNOs, MNOs retain
control by creating a subsidiary, while third-party MVNOs are independent in a
delegated value chain.
We assemble a unique panel dataset of MVNO launches and the performance of
hosting MNOs from 178 countries across 15 years. Building on the results from our
DID model, we employ dynamic propensity score matching to test the variation of
the treatment effects over time. Specifically, we conduct pairing in each quarter and
estimate the treatment effect year by year. This allows us to investigate the evolving
role of MVNOs with market maturity.
We find that, for existing technologies, i.e., 2G, launching either a branded or a
third-party MVNO would increase the market share of the hosting MNO. Specifically,
the impact of a branded MVNO launch tends to decrease over time, while the impact
of a third-party MVNO launch exhibits an increasing pattern. In an integrated value
chain (e.g., when launching a branded MVNO for market expansion), the hosting
firm maintains control of the value chain to mitigate the uncertainty and risks in
the new technology market segment (Ploner and Saredi 2020). On the other hand,
delegating to a third-party MVNO allows the hosting MNO to take advantage of
the complementary resources of the MVNO, which is more beneficial in a mature
market where margins shrink with intensified competition (Jaspers et al. 2007). For
new technologies, i.e., 3G, we find that launching a branded MVNO increases the
3G market share of the hosting MNO, which diminishes with market maturity over
time. When a new technology is adopted, MNOs are under great financial risks from
the upfront costs and uncertain demand in the new technology market (Tilson and
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Lyytinen 2006, Ansari and Garud 2009). In this case, the decision to delegate places
a great emphasis on quickly capitalizing the network capacity and avoiding potential
risk. As such, maintaining control in the new technology market expansion with
branded MVNOs to minimize risks can be more beneficial.
The extant literature has extensively studied the importance of pursuing exploration and exploitation, even piratically in the adaption to technology disruption
(March 1991, Levinthal and March 1993, Chandrasekaran et al. 2012a). In the adoption of new technologies, delegation allows firms to gain competitive advantage by
leveraging the complementary resources from their partners (Fuentelsaz et al. 2008).
Though previous studies have explored the internal organization structure (Gilbert
2005, Benner and Tushman 2003), the delegation has not been studied in the context
of ambidexterity, particularly with the context of migrating technology. Our research
extends the literature by establishing the causal effects of value chain governance (i.e.,
with branded vs. third-party MVNOs) on market performance under the context of
exploration and exploitation (i.e., 2G and 3G technologies). Further, as technology
development accelerates, a dynamic view is required to see the temporal changes of
different governance structures’ performance (Fuentelsaz et al. 2008, Siggelkow and
Levinthal 2003). In this study, we further extend the existing literature by examining
this dynamism.
In sum, the primary impact of new technologies on value chain governance can
be summarized as follows. Centralized governance of the value chain implies stronger
control of the value chain, which allows expansion to new markets with lower risk.
Without such control, as in the case of delegation, risks of incentive misalignment
may compound with the risks in the new markets. On the other hand, for existing
technologies, where risks are low and product differentiation is essential due to market
saturation, major service providers benefit directly from the complementary resources
acquired by involving other members of the value chain.
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To further examine the trade-off between control and complementary resources,
we conduct additional analyses based on two unique market segments: rural and
young populations. Accessing rural areas has been a challenge for MNOs because of
the higher operating costs that are twice as much as those in urban areas and the
lower revenue opportunities that are ten times lower (GSMA 2016). Thus, MVNOs
specializing in rural areas become a viable solution for MNOs (Buckwell and Liberatore 2018). We find that, when the need for complementary resources in the saturated
2G market is met with lower rural population, launches of third-party MVNOs show
a stronger treatment effect (see Appendix A.7.1 for details). On the other hand, for
the market segment of young people (aged 20-35) where users are "always looking
for the best" and thus more likely to switch (Ahmad et al. 2019), branded MVNOs
dominate because maintaining control is more important for MNOs (see Appendix
A.7.2 for details).
This study makes two contributions to the extant literature. First, we introduce
the important role of migrating technologies to the design of governance structure
in value chains. While value chain governance design is a core strategic component
of service providers, so are overlapping technologies and their implementation. We
provide the first causal evidence of the impact of structural changes in value chains
on the market performance of service providers under overlapping generations of
technologies. Second, the asymmetric patterns of the causal impacts between different
governance structures and generations of technology indicate strategic interactions
between control and risk in value chains.
This research also provides valuable insights for managers and policymakers on
how to design and regulate risky and highly costly value chains with ever-changing
technologies. Particularly, the arrival of 5G technology grants greater importance
to MVNOs in future telecommunication markets (Grimaldo 2019). Managers need
to become fully aware of the trade-off between delegation and centralization when
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they reach out to expand markets with different generations of technology. Managers
should maintain firm control at the onset of a new technology to proactively access
new markets and minimize cannibalization. However, they should leverage the scale
and efficiency from an independent third party when price competition becomes dominant, which is often the case with existing, mature technologies. This implication is
highly relevant and valuable now in the early stage of the 5G rollout.
Our study has some limitations. We collect information on launches of MVNOs
and their relationship with MNOs. While our unique data has led to the first causal
study on governance and technologies in service value chains, the study would have
provided a more in-depth contribution with MVNO-level information. However,
MVNOs are mostly private firms, whose financial and operating performance information are not available. Second, we do not have information on the service plans
and pricing mechanisms of MVNOs. This limits the ability to address MVNOs’ service and pricing heterogeneity. Third, our sample size is relatively small as a result
of missing data and matching criteria.
Future research can examine the impact of MVNOs from a value chain perspective
and compare the performance of MNOs and MVNOs as well as consumer welfare.
Future research could also enhance our results by including MVNO-level service plans
and pricing strategies, or even comparing these with MNO plans to determine the
optimal differentiation levels for MVNOs.
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Chapter 2
Delegation in Customer Acquisition and
Retention: A Structural Estimation
2.1

Introduction

During the Christmas season of 2018, T-Mobile posted an advertisement, “The Carriers Who (Almost) Stole Wireless", in which three greedy Grinch-like cartoon figures
try to squeeze their mobile service subscribers by various dirty deeds, such as hidden taxes and fees. As shown in Figure 2.1, of the three "Grinches", the blue and
red ones implicate mobile network operators (MNOs), AT&T and Verizon. However,
the third gray Grinch represents something categorically different. Lest the audience
miss it, T-mobile even puts the letter “C” on its body to implicate Comcast Mobile
(later renamed Xfinity Mobile), which is a mobile virtual network operator (MVNO).
Though MVNOs offer similar mobile services as MNOs, they do so without owning
any radio spectrum or network infrastructure (Shin 2010, Abolfathi et al. 2022b).
Instead, MVNOs provide mobile services to their subscribers by riding on their hosting MNO’s network. Comcast, specifically, is a telecom MVNO (also referred to as
Cable MVNO), which utilizes its own fixed-line services (e.g., internet and TV) to
offer triple and even quadruple service bundles including mobile telephone, internet,
cable, and fixed telephone (Connolly 2018, GSMA 2015). Given their bundling nature, telecom MVNOs often focus on the post-paid market with long-term contracts.
On the other hand, the counterpart of telecom MVNOs is the pre-paid market of discount MVNOs, which offer service plans with innovative and lower pricing targeting
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at specific market segments that were previously underserved by the hosting MNOs.
For example, Ting is a discount MVNO that provides a service plan where customers
are billed based on their actual usage of data with no fixed monthly payment. Telecom and discount MVNOs are the two most prevalent MVNO types, which together
account for more than 60% of the total number of MVNOs worldwide (Gillet 2012).

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Sgn4pvU7kc

Figure 2.1 “The Carriers Who (Almost) Stole
Wireles” by T-Mobile
As T-mobile’s advertisement shows, telecom MVNOs have gained rising power
in the telecommunication market. In fact, telecom MVNOs have been the fastestgrowing area for the past few years, and this trend is anticipated to continue (see
Figure 2.2). Accordingly, telecom MVNOs have become increasingly important as a
channel to bring more subscribers to an MNO’s network. For example, in 2018Q1,
the four big MNOs in the U.S. added 626,000 new lines, out of which 197,000 were
gained by Xfinity Mobile, an MVNO of Verizon (FCC 2017). On the other hand,
Ting mobile, one of the most popular discount MVNOs in the U.S., gained 286,000
subscribers in 2018 by offering innovative and highly customizable service plans (Dano
2018). In some European countries, the total market share of MVNOs accounts for
more than 40% of the total national market (e.g., the Netherlands and Germany).
Despite their important role in the telecommunication market, MVNOs have often
been ignored in the market competition by researchers and, especially, policymakers
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Source: Jennifer Andréoli-Fang and John T. Chapman (2020), Cable and Mobile Convergence: A Vision from the Cable Communities
Around the World. ISBE - 2020 Fall Technical Forum.

Figure 2.2 Net Additions of Telecom
MVNO Subscribers
(Connolly 2018). For example, the FCC decided not to consider MVNOs when analyzing the competitiveness of the wireless market (FCC 2010). The argument made
for this exclusion was that MVNOs rely entirely on MNOs for wholesale access to
facilities and, therefore, have no ability to compete with MNOs in terms of network
investments and upgrades. Though recognizing MVNOs as part of the “broader mobile wireless ecosystem”, the FCC still chose not to include MVNOs in its analysis of
competition in mobile wireless services (FCC 2017). To fill this gap, in this study, we
aim to examine how consumers choose mobile service plans when an MVNO is offered
and whether the demand varies based on the type of MVNO and mobile technology
offered.
Previous studies find pros and cons for both discount and telecom MVNOs (see
Figure ??). Zou et al. (2020) show that discount MVNOs help garner more subscribers
to their hosting MNO networks and lead to rapid market expansion. However, behind
the benefit of market expansion, the lower prices offered by discount MVNOs could
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also intensify the competition on the market (Anderson and Simester 2010). As a
result, discount MVNO customers may be constantly in search of better prices and
thus increase the churn rate and, most importantly, hinder the hosting MNO from
converting their pre-paid subscribers to post-paid service plans, which generate the
majority of the revenue for MNOs (FCC 2017). On the other hand, the service
bundling offered by telecom MVNOs increases switching costs, which facilitate the
conversion of pre-paid customers to long-term post-paid plans (Prince and Greenstein
2014). If they decide to switch, a customer will need to breach the long-term contract
and re-install other fixed line services as well. The increased switching costs associated
with telecom MVNOs thus help MNOs convert and retain more profitable post-paid
users (Connolly 2018). Given the advantages and disadvantages of discount and
telecom MVNOs, little is known about their impact on the telecommunication market,
especially when offered alone or together. Therefore, our first research question is:
How do customers choose mobile service plans when they are offered discount and
telecom MVNOs?

Figure 2.3 Study Framework

Further, the impact of MVNOs may differ for different generations of the mobile technology market. As Figure 2.4 shows, from 2G to 4G, each new generation
of mobile network technology offers fundamental functionality changes (Ansari and
Garud 2009), which adds to their synergy with fixed-line services offered by cable
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companies. Specifically, the upgrade to 3G enables online surfing through cellular
networks, which shifts the mobile services from voice-centric to data-centric (Tilson
and Lyytinen 2006). More importantly, web browsing functionality compliments the
internet services offered by cable companies, so subscribers can use internet services
at home and outdoors. Further, the upgrade to 4G increases the transmission speed
of cellular networks up to 500 times that of 3G1 , which enables high-resolution mobile TV and video streaming. As a result, under 4G, mobile services fully cover and
complement the functionality of fixed-line services. Therefore, as mobile network
technology evolves, the synergy between mobile services and fixed-line services may
shift accordingly, which leads to our second research question: How does MVNOs’
impact on mobile service plans differ for different generations of mobile technologies?

Figure 2.4 Functionality of Fixed Line Services and Mobile
Network Technologies (2G, 3G, and 4G)
1

https://www.verizon.com/about/our-company/5g/difference-between-3g-4g-5g
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To address these research questions, we obtain a unique proprietary dataset from
the mobile network industry. Using the data collected, we adopt the nested structural
model proposed by Berry (1994) with instrumental variables to correct endogeneity
(Berry et al. 1995). The nested structural model allows us to explore the demand
changes for different MVNO offerings (i.e., discount only, telecom only, and both).
Our findings suggest that a discount MVNO increases the own-price elasticity of
its hosting MNO, whereas we do not observe this increase if a telecom MVNO is
also offered. This indicates that the price competition caused by discount MVNOs
could be mitigated by telecom MVNOs, which differentiate the market by bundling
mobile services with other fixed-line services in long-term contracts. Moreover, the
synergy between discount and telecom MVNOs is more prominent in advanced mobile technologies (e.g., 4G). The combination of the two MVNO types increases the
market share of their hosting MNOs in a greater degree compared with each offered separately. This may be because more advanced mobile technologies offer more
functionalities than previous generations of technologies, which further empowers
the service bundling offered by telecom MVNOs. For example, the video streaming
capability made available by 4G compliments cable TV services and thus attracts
more customers to long-term post-paid service contracts, which reduces price competition in the market. To further examine the underlying mechanism between MVNO
adoption and consumer choices, we extend our analysis by employing a simple quasiexperiment, in which we employ a difference-in-differences (DID) embedded generalized random forest (GRF) method. We find that, though they significantly help with
market expansion, discount MVNOs hurt the profitability of their hosting MNOs. On
the other hand, telecom MVNOs slightly increase the revenue of their hosting MNOs.
More importantly, when offered in combination, discount and telecom MVNOs increase the total connections and revenue of their hosting MNOs. Further, the synergy
between telecom and discount MNOs is stronger in the 4G market.
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Our findings have practical implications for both managers and policy makers.
First, for MNO managers, our findings suggest that, instead of being offered alone,
the combination of discount and telecom MVNOs should be considered in the market
planning of MNOs, especially in the case that an MNO tries to expand to a more
advanced technology market. Second, policy makers should be aware of the increasingly important role of MVNOs in the telecommunication market and include them in
the monitoring of the market analysis. Additionally, policy makers should encourage
cooperation between MNOs and cable companies, which would create more value for
customers instead of price competition between MNOs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We provide a review of the related
literature in Section 2 and describe our data and method in Section 3. In Section 4, we
discuss the construction and results of our nested structural model, which is followed
by a set of robustness tests. In Section 5, we extend our analysis by using a quasiexperimental design to explore the heterogeneity in the impact of MVNOs. Lastly,
in Section 6, we conclude the study by discussing the contributions and implications
of the results.

2.2

Background and Literature

This study connects with two streams of literature on delegation and on the balance
between customer acquisition and retention. In the rest of this section, we first discuss
the literature on customer acquisition and retention in the context of pre-paid and
post-paid service plans in the telecommunication industry. We then follow up by
discussing how delegating to MVNOs may help balance customer acquisition and
retention.
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2.2.1

Customer Acquisition and Retention in the Telecommunication
Industry

Previous studies find that working with MVNOs increases the market share of hosting
MNOs in both existing and new mobile technology markets (Zou et al. 2020). In fact,
these market share increases can be dismantled into two important parts: customer
acquisition and customer retention. Ideally, one would balance customer retention
and acquisition simultaneously, since market share benefits from the coordination of
the two (McGahan and Ghemawat 1994, Thomas 2001). This is particularly the case
in the mobile telecommunication market.
However, the effort made to increase customer acquisition may inadvertently reduce the effectiveness of customer retention, which is commonly referred to as the
spoiling effect (Dong et al. 2011). Our research context, i.e., the mobile telecommunication industry, is a perfect manifestation of the conflict between customer acquisition
and retention. Distinguished by the tariff, the service plans offered by MNOs can be
classified into pre-paid and post-paid plans (Abolfathi et al. 2022b). With pre-paid
plans, subscribers choose and pay for the services (e.g., data and SMS) before using
them, while with post-paid, subscribers usually have a contract or account with an
MNO that includes an allocation of services that users are billed for monthly (Banker
et al. 1998). Though differentiated by the tariff, the core difference between the
two service plan types lies in the targeted market segmentation. Pre-paid service
plans are usually targeted at cost-conscious, younger subscribers who have a limited
budget to allocate on mobile services. Conversely, post-paid services work better for
heavy users (Eggers et al. 2020). Due to the "zero-sum" nature of mobile service
plan subscription, pre-paid and post-paid plans increasingly compete with each other
(Connolly 2018).
Despite this conflict, the pre-paid and post-paid markets also work together. Abolfathi et al. (2022a) find that many MNOs adopt a “funnel business model", where
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MNOs first attract subscribers with a basic and affordable pre-paid mobile service
plan and later on convert the early adopters to an advanced and more profitable
post-paid plan. As noted by its chief executive officer Darren Entwistle, the market
strategy of Telus Corporation is to “grow and cultivate a pre-paid base and harvest
that base as it relates to pre to post migration” (Telus Corporation 2018). Given the
fact that post-paid subscribers generate more revenue for MNOs, the pre-paid service plans sometimes serve as a “gateway" to bring the potential customers on board
with the expectation of the “lock-in" effect, where, when migrating to a post-paid
plan, subscribers are more likely to choose the MNO with which they already have a
pre-paid service plan (Shi et al. 2016).

2.2.2

MVNOs and Delegation

The synergy between customer acquisition and retention can be achieved in a centralized setting or through delegation (Bhardwaj 2001, Lal 1986, Mishra and Prasad
2004, 2005). Though the majority of related studies focus on direct selling, few have
explored the role of delegation in customer acquisition and retention. For example,
Dong et al. (2011) find that the spoiling effect can be effectively mitigated by a delegation mechanism in customer acquisition and retention, compared to direct selling.
In the mobile telecommunication industry, the specialized market segments across
the pre-paid and post-paid plans demand market know-how and customization of
service plans to excel in both markets, playing into the hand of MVNOs and offering
complementary resources to the hosting MNOs (Camarán and De Miguel 2008).
In the post-paid market, telecom MVNOs could help their hosting networks retain more subscribers. Brush et al. (2012) and Abolfathi et al. (2022b) find that
subscriber migration from pre-paid to post-paid works better with the presence of
high switching costs that create a hurdle for subscribers to switch to another service
provider when considering an upgrade to post-paid plans. Telecom MVNOs increase
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the switching costs by providing double-, triple-, and even quadruple-play bundles
for services including TV, fixed voice, fixed-line internet, and mobile services. If
they decide to switch, a subscriber will need to breach the long-term term contract
and re-install other fixed-line services as well (Prince and Greenstein 2014). Thus,
through increased switching costs, telecom MVNOs help the customer retention of
their hosting MNOs by converting subscribers to post-paid plans (Connolly 2018).
According to the funnel business model, the realization of post-paid customer conversion is built on a sufficient pre-paid customer base (Arora et al. 2017). Thus,
customer acquisition in the pre-paid market is equally important to customer retention in the post-paid market. In the case of the pre-paid market, discount MVNOs
can leverage their market know-how and innovative pricing scheme to add value to
MNOs by targeting segments that were previously underserved by MNOs due to low
profitability if targeted by MNOs directly (Mayo 2013).
In the ideal scenario, discount and telecom MVNOs would serve their roles independently to facilitate the funnel business model in the telecommunication market.
However, the impacts of partnering with discount and telecom MVNOs could be intertwined because the two service plan types are also competitors due to the “zero-sum’
nature of mobile usage; i.e., subscribers rarely choose to subscribe to both service
plans (Connolly 2018). Thus, the budget service plans offered by discount MVNOs,
though they attract pre-paid subscribers, may create hesitation or even an obstacle
for post-paid conversion (FCC 2017). Previous studies have focused on key drivers for
the success of MVNOs (Corrocher and Lasio 2013, Shin and Bartolacci 2007, Lee et al.
2008), the social welfare effects of MVNOs for policy implications (Shin 2010, Kim
and Seol 2007), and market expansion in these rapidly changing technologies (Zou
et al. 2020). However, little attention has been given to the adoption of MVNOs from
the perspective of customer acquisition and retention.
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2.3

Data

To study our research questions, we collect proprietary data related to MVNO characteristics and MNO market performance. In the following, we introduce the data
and describe the sample with related statistics.
Telecom and Discount MVNOs. We collect MVNO information from an
independent research company specialized in the telecommunication industry. The
dataset was acquired with a panel of 60 quarters from 2000Q1 to 2014Q4 with missing
observations. The MVNO data contains information about the MVNO name and its
hosting MNO, the MVNO classification (discount or telecom), and the MVNO launch
date. For example, AT&T launched a discount MVNO, H2O Wireless, in 2003Q4.
The MVNO data includes 516 MVNO launches, of which 347 are discount and 169
are telecom MVNOs.
MNO market performance. We also collect MNO financial performance information from the dataset provided by the same research company, including revenue,
average revenue per user (ARPU), total connections and market share, etc. The
performance dataset contains the quarterly financial and performance data of MNOs
from 178 countries and covers the same time frame as the MVNO data (2000Q1 to
2014Q4). The MNOs in our sample are highly consistent with those on the list of the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU). These datasets have been employed
in recent related studies (e.g., Dong et al. 2018, 2020b, Zou et al. 2020).
Prior to merging, we clean these two raw datasets. For the MNO performance
data, we disqualify 34 MNOs in the overseas territories that have been listed as
Non-Self-Governing Territories by the UN General Assembly, such as Guam, because
MNOs are mostly subsidiaries of their parent firms in the administering countries.2
Second, we keep MNOs in the countries that have at least two MNOs, because market
2

https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/nsgt
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share, which is used as a core variable in our analysis, will not be available in a
monopolized telecommunication market. Third, we exclude observations if an MNO
uses only 1G technology in a given quarter. This is because 1G was not made widely
available to consumers, and MVNOs only appeared starting with 2G technology, so
1G technology is not relevant to this study.
Following previous studies (e.g., Zou et al. 2020), we construct dummy variables
as indicators of MVNO launches, coded as 1 if an MNO has launched a discount
(or telecom) MVNO and 0 otherwise. Mobile network technologies are measured as
a categorical variable with three levels, coded as 0, 1, and 2 for 2G, 3G, and 4G,
respectively. We also construct several variables as controls, for example, gross domestic product (GDP) and population as a control for country-level heterogeneity in
economic development and potential market sizes, respectively. We provide detailed
variable construction and definition in Table 2.1.
Finally, by using country and MNO names as identifiers, we merge the two datasets
together. Among 135 MNOs that launched MVNO services, 124 MNOs are matched
with financial and performance data. Among those 124 MNOs, 51 launched discount
MVNOs only, 22 launched telecom MVNOs only, and 51 launched both telecom and
discount MVNOs in the time frame of our study. Combined with the 557 MNOs
that did not launch any MVNO by the fourth quarter of 2014, we assemble a sample
containing 681 uniquely identified MNOs in 116 countries. After the aggregation
of the data sources, we prepare a final sample containing 60,240 MNO quarter-level
observations with missing data. Before we transform the panel data to nested format,
we report descriptive statistics of the core variables in Table 2.2.

2.4

Main Analysis

In this section, we explore the underlying mechanism of how discount and telecom
MVNOs impact the price and demand of their hosting MNOs and, in particular,
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Table 2.1 Variable Definition and Construction
Variable

Category

MS

Dependent

DS

Independent

TL

Independent

DS_T L

Independent

T ech

Independent

ARP U

Independent

GDP

Control

PL

Control

CN

Control

M SA

Control

Definition and Construction
Market share is measured by total connections at the
end of the quarter, expressed as a percentage share
of the total market connections.
A dummy variable indicating whether an MNO offers
a discount MVNO (excluding those who also offer a
telecom MVNO), coded as 1 if an MNO launched a
discount MVNO and 0 otherwise.
A dummy variable indicating whether an MNO offers
a telecom MVNO (excluding those who also offer a
discount MVNO), coded as 1 if an MNO launched a
telecom MVNO and 0 otherwise.
A dummy variable indicating whether an MNO
launched both discount and telecom MVNOs, coded
as 1 if so and 0 otherwise.
A categorical variable indicating the generation of
mobile network technology used by an MNO, coded
as 0, 1, and 2 for 2G, 3G, and 4G, respectively.
Average revenue per user is calculated by the total
revenue of an MNO divided by its total number of
subscribers, which captures the degree to which an
MNO is able to generate revenue from its user base
Gross domestic product is extracted from the World
Bank database, which captures the across-country
heterogeneity of economic development. The measure
is log-transformed due to right-skewed distribution.
Population is extracted from the World Bank
database, which captures the across-country heterogeneity of potential total market sizes. The measure
is log-transformed due to right-skewed distribution.
Total connections is the total number of subscribers
that an MNO currently has, which captures the current user base of an MNO. The measure is logtransformed due to right-skewed distribution.
Net market share addition is calculated by the number of connections added of an MNO divided by the
total new subscriber additions in a market, which
captures the current competitiveness of an MNO.

whether such an impact varies across different mobile technologies. We accomplish
this by using an aggregate demand estimation model. In what follows, we first introduce the setup of the structural model and endogeneity concerns. We then report

51

Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics
Variable

TL
DS
T L_DS
T ech
MS
ARP U
GDP
PL
CN
M SA

Observations

Mean

Std. dev.

Categorical Variables
180,720
0.03
0.18
180,720
0.05
0.22
180,720
0.03
0.17
180,720
1.00
0.82
Continuous Variables
59,672
0.35
0.29
81,126
19.62
17.28
148,068
24.65
2.53
151,032
16.42
2.00
59,672
12.57
2.65
57,603
0.34
1.09

Min

Max

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

1.00
1.00
1.00
2.00

0.00
0.00
16.40
11.26
2.08
0.00

1.00
184.82
30.45
21.03
20.25
1.97

Notes: To correct the skewness of distributions, GDP , P L, and CN are log transformed.

and discuss the findings from the structural models with additional tests to verify the
robustness of the models.

2.4.1

Condition Nested Models

To estimate the demand changes in the telecommunication market, we employ the
aggregate demand estimation model proposed by Berry (1994), which is commonly
referred to as the BLP method. The BLP method has been widely adopted by
recent studies in the operations management field as an approach for estimating how
consumers choose between products with heterogeneous characteristics (e.g., McKie
et al. 2018, Dong et al. 2020b, Xu et al. 2021). In our case, the BLP model allows
us to explore the underlying mechanism of the impact of mobile network technology
and MVNO offerings on the price and demand of mobile services. To fit the BLP
model into our context, we first define the utility function as:
Uij = αpj + βx′j + ξj + ϵij
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(2.1)

where Uij is the utility function of subscriber i to mobile service provider j. pj and x′j
are two observable factors, where pj is the price of mobile service provider j and x′j is a
vector of product and market characteristics. ξj is a vector of product characteristics
such as signal strength and local reputation of mobile service provider j, which is
unsearchable to researchers. Finally, ϵij is an error term that captures consumer i’s
individual-level preference for mobile service provider j. By leveraging the inversion
method in Berry (1994), we derive the aggregated utility model as:
δj =αpj + βx′j + ξj
ln (sj ) − ln (s0 ) =δj = αpj + βx′j + ξj

(2.2)

where sj =CNj /P Lj ,
s0 =(P Lj − CNj )/P Lj
where sj and s0 are the market share of mobile service j and outside options of market
j, respectively. sj is calculated by an MNOs’ total mobile service connections (CNj )
in a country divided by the total population (P Lj ) of that country in a given period.
s0 is calculated as the difference between total population and total connections in
a market (P Lj − CNj ) and the total population (P Lj ) in that country for a given
period. The non-nested model above may suffer from violation of the independence
of irrelevant alternatives, which is a core assumption of choice models (Berry et al.
1995). Specifically, the assumption is likely to be violated because MVNO users
are more likely to choose another MNO that offers similar MVNO when their first
choice is not available. Alternatively, it also could be the case that mobile users are
more likely to subscribe to service providers that offer the same generation of mobile
network technology than opt for those whose service plans are based on a different
mobile network technology. However, since the best nesting structure is unobservable
to us, we do not make any assumptions on the best nesting structure. Instead, we
employ two separate models to cover both plausible nesting structures.
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We first build the model nested by discount and telecom MVNOs. For the analysis
of discount MVNOs, we create two nests based on whether an MNO partners with a
discount MVNO or not (i.e., d = 0, 1), where d = 1 contains MNOs offering discount
MVNOs, d = 2 contains MNOs not offering discount MVNOs, and d = 0 contains
the outside options. To further explore the role of telecom MVNOs, we select the
subsample of MNOs that have already offered discount MVNOs. Similar to the build
of the discount MVNO model, we create two nests based on whether an MNO partners
with a telecom MVNO or not (i.e., t = 0, 1, 2), where the nests are defined in the
same fashion as the discount MVNO model above. Therefore, based on Equation
(2.2), we derive the nested model for discount and telecom MVNOs as:
ln (sj ) − ln (s0 ) = δj = αpj + βx′j + σ ln (sj|d ) + ξj

(2.3)

ln (sj ) − ln (s0 ) = δj = αpj + βx′j + σ ln (sj|t ) + ξj

(2.4)

where σ is the factor of substitutability, which ranges from 0 to 1. sj|d and sj|t are
the market shares of mobile service provider j in nests d and t, respectively. We then
build the model nested by mobile network technology. We create 3 nests based on the
different generations of technologies, where g = 2 contains 2G services, g = 3 contains
3G services, and g = 4 contains 4G services. The baseline level g = 1 contains the
outside options. Similarly, we derive the nested model for mobile network technologies
as:
ln (sj ) − ln (s0 ) = δj = αpj + βx′j + σ ln (sj|g ) + ξj

(2.5)

where sj|g is the market share of mobile service provider j in nest g.

2.4.2

Endogeneity and Instrumental Variables

In the models built above, we use ARPU as an approximate for the price of mobile
service offered by an MNO. However, the price of mobile services, as well as nested
market share, could be endogenous because they could potentially be correlated with
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unobserved factors. For instance, if there is a regional shock that causes variation in
the demand for a particular service plan or mobile network technology, the service
providers may adjust the price for their service plan offerings accordingly. We thus
adopt two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression with instrumental variables (IVs) for
the two endogenous variables, i.e., price and nested market share, to address this
potential endogeneity issue. Specifically, we use the sum of the characteristics of
other MVNO services within a nest in a market as the instruments for the price of
mobile services and nested market share. For example, for the service price of an
MNO, we use the total number of telecom MVNOs and the total number of discount
MVNOs offered by other MNOs in the same market as the instruments:


K





1  Xj DS 
DS 
Nkt
− Nkt
DS_IVit =
K −1
k=1

(2.6)

where K is the number of MNOs in the same market as MNO i (including MNO i
DS
denotes the total number of telecom MVNOs of focal firm i.
itself). Nkt

PKj

k=1

DS
Nkt

represents the sum of telecom MVNOs of all firms in focal firm i’s industry. Thus,
the instrument of discount MNO characteristics (DS_IVit ) is calculated by the average number of telecom MVNOs offered by other MNOs in the same market. The
instrument of telecom MVNO characteristics (T L_IVit ) is constructed in the same
fashion:


K





1  Xj T L 
T L
T L_IVit =
Nkt − Nkt
K −1
k=1

(2.7)

An appropriate instrument needs to satisfy the conditions of relevance and the
exclusion restriction assumption (Wooldridge 2010). We thus justify the validity of
the instrumental variables accordingly. First, the instruments satisfy the relevance
requirement because they are correlated with prices via the markups in the firstorder conditions (Berry et al. 1995). Second, these instruments satisfy the exclusion
restriction assumption because service plan characteristics are independent from the
utility (Uij or δj ) defined in Equations (2.1) and (2.2). This type of instrument was
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first used in Hausman (1997) and then widely adopted in subsequent economics and
business research (e.g., Petrin and Train 2010, Ghose et al. 2012, Dong et al. 2020a),
especially in studies using a choice model (e.g., Dong et al. 2020b).
We next validate our approach using endogeneity tests. First, we test for weak
instruments. In the first stage of 2SLS, we find that the R2 s are high (R2 > 0.50)
and that the F-statistics are 47.15 (p < 0.001) and 107.71 (p < 0.001) for service
price and nested market share, respectively, suggesting that the IV has strong correlation with the endogenous variables (Staiger and Stock 1994, Fischer et al. 2016).
Second, we conduct the under-identification test of the instruments. The F-statistics
of the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM under-identification test is 188.97 (p < 0.001), which
rejects the null hypothesis that our instrumental variables are under-identified. Thus,
our instrumental variables are exactly and strongly identified in the 2SLS regression.
Lastly, we statistically test the most important assumption, i.e., exclusion restriction, by leveraging the “plausible exogenous” test. We adopt the local-to-zero (LTZ)
approach proposed by Conley et al. (2012) to check the validity of our instruments
when the exclusion restriction is not perfectly satisfied. Specifically, we first obtain
prior information from a reduced form regression, where we regress the dependent
variable on the two instruments (DS_IV and T L_IV ). The regression model is as
follows:
ln (sj ) − ln (s0 ) = δj = α1 pj + α2 ln (sj|g ) + γ1 DS_IV + γ2 T L_IV + βx′j + ξj (2.8)
We then test the validity of our instruments under different degrees of violation of
the exclusion restriction assumption, that is, in our case, when γ1 and γ2 deviate from
0. The results are demonstrated in Figure 2.5, where Panels (a) and (b) represent the
estimated coefficients and the corresponding 90% confidence intervals of the linear
and quadratic terms of the endogenous variables (βb1 and βb2 ) when the values of δ1
and δ2 increase from 0.5 to 2.5 times the standard errors. Figure 5 Panel (a) shows
that the estimated coefficient of service price (α1 ) remains positive and significantly
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different from zero at the deviation of δ1 up to 1.5 times the standard error. Panel
(b) shows that the estimated coefficient of nested market share (α2 ) remains negative
and significant when δ2 deviates to 2 times the standard error. In summary, even
when γ1 and γ2 moderately deviate from 0, the estimation of the first- and secondorder of the endogenous variables remains informative. We therefore conclude that
a moderate violation of the exclusion restriction assumption does not invalidate the
two instrumental variables we constructed (Gopinath et al. 2013, Fischer et al. 2016,
Aven and Hillmann 2018).

Figure 2.5 Plausible Exogenous Tests of Instrumental Variables

2.4.3

Demand Heterogeneity of Telecom and Discount MVNOs

In this section, we report the estimated results from the nested models built for discount and telecom MVNOs, respectively. The results for the estimations of Equations
(2.3) and (2.4) are given in Models 1 and 2 of Table 2.3, respectively. We first report
the results from the models nested by discount MVNO in Table 2.3 Model 1, where
the coefficient of price is negative and significant (α = 0.113, p < 0.001), while the
coefficient of nested market share is positive and significant (σ = 0.965, p < 0.001).
The estimated σ falls into the required interval of [0, 1], suggesting that the model
nesting is supported (Berry 1994). Further, we also find statistical significance in
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GDP, total population, and total connections. We then report the results from the
models nested by telecom MVNO in Table 2.3 Model 2, where the coefficient of price
is negative and significant (α = 0.261, p < 0.05), while the coefficient of nested market share is positive and significant (σ = 0.908, p < 0.001), which also falls into the
required interval of [0, 1]. For the control variables, we find that only GDP and total
population are significant.
Table 2.3 Models Nested by Discount and Telecom MVNOs: 2SLS Estimation with
IV (DV: ln (sj ) − ln (s0 ) )

VARIABLES
P rice(pi )
ln (sj|g )
GDP
PL
CN
M SA
3G
4G
Constant
Quarter FE
Observations

(1)
Condition Model Nested by
Discount MVNO

(2)
Condition Model Nested by
Telecom MVNO

-0.113***
0.965***
1.646***
-1.834***
1.764***
-0.000
0.051
0.119
-9.810***

-0.261*
0.908***
3.430*
-3.246*
0.490
-0.012
-0.266†
0.284
-27.279†

(0.003)
(0.007)
(0.020)
(0.021)
(0.191)
(0.000)
(0.033)
(0.100)
(0.148)
Included
21,277

(0.133)
(0.037)
(1.621)
(1.365)
(0.423)
(0.024)
(0.151)
(0.515)
(15.107)
Included
1,261

Notes: Models 1 and 2 report the estimated coefficient values and robust standard errors (in parentheses) of Equations
(2.3) and (2.4), respectively. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1. To correct the skewness of distributions,
GDP , P L, and CN are log-transformed.

To calculate own-price elasticity and cross-price elasticity, we plug the estimated
coefficients of service price (α) and nested market share (σ) into the equation below:
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αpi 1/(1 − σ) − σ/1 − σ)si|n − pi si








∂si ∂pj
= −pi σ/(1 − σ)si|n + sj
∂pj ∂si 







p

if i = j
if i ̸= j, i ∈ n, i ∈
/n
(2.9)
if i ̸= j, i, j ∈ n

j sj

where n = d or n = t
where i and j denote observations. n denotes the nesting of discount MVNOs (d)
or the nesting of telecom MVNOs (t). For example, for the own-price elasticity of
discount MVNOs, we estimate whether the own-price elasticity of an MNO nest that
offers discount MVNOs (d = 1) differs from the own-price elasticity of an MNO nest
that does not offer discount MVNOs (d = 0). Specifically, we use the 95% upper
and lower confidence interval of α and σ to check whether the elasticity estimates
of the nests are significantly different from each other at the 95% significance level.
For cross-price elasticities, we estimate whether the cross-price elasticities of service
i1 and j1 (i1 ̸= j1 , (i1 , j1 ) ̸= (i2 , j2 )) are different from the cross-price elasticity of
the pair (i2 , j2 ). Similarly, the 95% confidence interval is constructed by using the
estimated upper and lower bound of α and σ.
We report the estimated own-price elasticity and cross-price elasticity in Table
2.4, where the own- and cross-price elasticities are averaged at the condition level
(with and without discount or telecom MVNOs). The values of the diagonal report
average own-price elasticities for MNOs with different MVNO offerings. The values
of the diagonal report average cross-price elasticity values for each MVNO offering
pairing. The own-price elasticity values show the percentage decrease in market share
when the price of a service offering increases by one percent. The cross-price elasticity
values show how price changes in the MVNO offering listed in the table columns affect
market share for the MVNO offering listed in the table rows.
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Table 2.4 Own-Price Elasticity and Cross-Price Elasticity of Discount and Telecom
MVNOs
Panel (a): Discount MVNO (d)

0
1

0

1

-2.08

0.98

1.55

Panel (b): Telecom MVNO (t)

a

-4.01

0

1

0

-5.11

1.71

1

2.03

-2.09a

Notes: Panels (a) and (b) report the estimated own-price and cross-price elasticity using Equation (2.9) and estimated
coefficients α and σ from Table 2.3. a denotes that the own-price elasticity of MNOs that offer discount (telecom)
MVNO services is different from that of MNOs that do not offer discount (telecom) MVNO services by the 95%
significance level.

In Table 2.4 Panel (a), we find that a 1% increase in the price of service with
discount MVNO is associated with a 4.01% decrease in the market share, while a 1%
increase in the price of service without discount MVNO is associated with a -2.08%
decrease in the market share. Further, we find that the two own-price elasticities in
Panel (a) dependent on the offering of discount MVNO are statistically significant
at the 95% level. The significant difference in the own-price elasticities suggests that
though discount MVNOs garner more users onto an MNO’s network, they intensify
the price competition in the market because discount MVNOs usually offer service
plans at a budget price. As a result, customers may keep searching for better prices
in the market, which makes it more difficult for MNOs to lock them into the more
profitable post-paid service plans. For cross-price elasticity, we find that a 1% increase
in the price of service without discount MVNO increases the market share of service
with discount MVNO by 1.55%, while a 1% increase in the price of service with
discount MVNO increases the market share of service without discount MVNO by
0.95%. The two cross-price elasticities, however, are not statistically different at the
95% significance level. We thus do not make any further inference on them.
In Table 2.4 Panel (b), we find that a 1% increase in the price of service without
telecom MVNO (discount MVNO only) is associated with a -5.11% decrease in the
market share, while a 1% increase in the price of service with telecom MVNO (under
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the condition where discount MVNO has been offered) is associated with a -2.09%
decrease in the market share. The difference of the two own-price elasticities for telecom MVNOs is statistically significant at 95% level, indicating that telecom MVNOs
reduce the level of price competition on the market, which is especially powerful when
the competition intensity is increased by the discount MVNOs. Benefiting from triple
or quadruple service bundling, telecom MVNOs serve as intermediaries that transfer current pre-paid users to post-paid users with long-time contracts, which reduces
price competition by differentiating the market. Thus, telecom MVNOs could be a
powerful tool for MNOs to mitigate the price competition triggered by the use of discount MVNOs (Prince and Greenstein 2014). For cross-price elasticity, a 1% increase
in the price of service without telecom MVNO increases the market share of service
with telecom MVNO by 2.03%, while a 1% increase in the price with telecom MVNO
increases the market share of service without telecom MVNO by 1.71%. The two
cross-price elasticities, however, are not statistically different at the 95% significance
level. We therefore do not make any further inference on them.

2.4.4

Demand Heterogeneity of Mobile Network Technologies

Next, as an alternate nesting specification, we estimate the models nested by mobile
network technologies, where we assume that customers are more likely to choose
another MNO that offers the same generation of mobile network technology (2G, 3G,
or 4G) when their first choice is unavailable. Similar to Section 2.4.3, we first estimate
the technology nested model in Equation (2.5) to obtain the coefficients of service
price (α) and nested market share (σ) and report the estimated results in Table 2.5.
We find statistical and economic significance in service price (α = −0.066, p < 0.001)
and nested market share (σ = 0.800, p < 0.001). Again, the estimated β is within
the required range of [0, 1], which supports the model nesting build. Further, from
the dummy variables of MVNO offerings, we also find that the offering of discount
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MVNO only is associated with a higher market share (β = 0.064, p < 0.001), while
the combination of discount and telecom MVNOs further boosts the market share to
the next level (β = 0.191, p < 0.05)). Additionally, we do not find any significance
with MNOs offering only telecom MVNOs.
Table 2.5 Models Nested by Mobile Network Technologies: 2SLS Estimation with
IV (DV: ln (sj ) − ln (s0 ) )

VARIABLES
P rice(pi )
ln (sj|g )
GDP
PL
CN
M SA
DS
TL
DS_T L
Constant
Quarter FE
Observations

(3)
Nested by
Mobile Network Technologies
-0.066***
0.800***
1.281***
-1.522***
2.411***
-0.000
0.064***
0.004
0.191*
-9.810***

(0.003)
(0.009)
(0.021)
(0.023)
(0.163)
(0.000)
(0.016)
(0.098)
(0.091)
(0.148)
Included
21,277

Notes: Model 3 reports the estimated coefficient values and robust standard errors (in
parentheses) of Equation (2.5), respectively. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p <
0.1. To correct the skewness of distributions, GDP , P L, and CN are log-transformed.

Following the same process as that in Section 2.4.3, we estimate own-price elasticity and cross-price elasticity by plugging the estimated coefficients of price (α)
and nested market share (σ) in Table 2.5 into Equation (2.9). We then report the
estimated elasticity averaged at the technology level in Table 2.6. For own-price elasticities in the diagonal, we find that the own-price elasticity of 3G is significantly
greater than that of 2G and 4G at a 95% significance level, suggesting that 2G and
4G technologies are more sensitive to their own price changes compared with 3G
technology. The cross-price elasticities values in Table 2.6 indicate how the market
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share of the technologies listed in the table rows would react to 1% price changes
in the technologies listed in the columns intersecting with them. For example, a 1%
increase in the price of 4G (the column on the far right) increases the market share
of 2G by 1.97% and of 3G by 1.89%. We find interesting dynamics between 3G and
4G technologies — a 1.89% increase in the market share of 3G increases the price of
4G technology by 1%. Conversely, the 4G market share also significantly increases
by 2.03% when the price of 3G technology increases by 1%. This suggests a greater
level of substitutability between 3G and 4G compared with other technology pairs.
Table 2.6 Own-Price Elasticity and Cross-Price Elasticity of Mobile Network Technologies
Mobile Network Technologies (g)
2G

3G

4G

2G

-3.98

1.01b

1.97b

3G

1.37

-2.24a

1.89b

4G

1.32

2.03b

-3.44

Notes: This table reports the estimated own-price and cross-price elasticity
using Equation (2.9) and estimated coefficients α and σ from Table 2.5.
a denotes that the own-price elasticity of 2G, 3G, and 4G technology is
different from the own-price elasticity of another technology. b denotes that
the cross-price elasticity of technology pair (g1 , g2 ) is different from the crossprice elasticity of technology pair 2G and 3G (3, 2), where g1 ̸= g2 and
(g1 , g2 ) ̸= (3, 2).

Next, in Table 2.7, we report the elasticities for the overall sample of mobile
network technologies, as well as the breakdown of the average values of MVNO offerings, including discount only (DS), telecom only (T L), and the combination of
both MVNO types (DI_T L). Note that, though T L is not significant in Table 2.5,
we report its calculated elasticity breakdown for comparison purposes. As shown in
Table 2.7, the overall elasticity of discount MVNO is 0.13%, suggesting that offering
discount MVNO is associated with a higher market share. The effect of market share
increase is much higher with 4G technology compared to 2G and 3G technologies.
Further, the overall elasticity of the combination of discount and telecom MVNOs is
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0.30%, suggesting that offering the combination of the two MVNO types is associated with a higher market share compared to offering only one. Similar to offering
discount MVNO only, the market share increase is significantly higher with 3G and
4G technologies compared with 2G technology. Thus, the effect of offering MVNOs,
either discount only or both discount and telecom, is stronger with more advanced
technologies, particularly 4G technology.
Table 2.7 Elasticities of Discount and Telecom MVNOs: Breakdown of Different
Generations of Mobile Network Technology

Average
2G
3G
4G

2.4.5

Discount

Telecom

Discount &
Telecom

0.13
0.12
0.13
0.20

-0.03
-0.03
-0.03
-0.05

0.30
0.28
0.40
0.38

Robustness Tests

To verify the robustness of our main results, we conduct two robustness tests as
follows. First, we include GDP and total population in our main models, which
otherwise may not be able to fully capture the heterogeneity across countries. We
thus adopt the alternative specification with country-level fixed effects to re-estimate
Equations (2.3), (2.4), and (2.5). The results after including country-level fixed effects
remain consistent with our main results (see Table B.2).
Second, to further account for the heterogeneity across MNOs, we test the model
with MNO-level fixed effects. Again, the results after including the MNO-level fixed
effects are consistent with our main results (see Table B.1). Though the two models
discussed above have the advantages of better accounting for country- or MNO-level
heterogeneity, we do not use them as our main models because of the concern about
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multicollinearity. Because the nests in the structural models are built based on markets (countries), models with the country- and MNO-level fixed effects can only be
used as robustness tests to avoid potential multicollinearity (Dong et al. 2020b).

2.5

Extension

Though we find that MVNOs reduce the price competition and increase the market
share of their hosting MNOs, the ultimate goal for MNOs is their profitability. Financial performance, therefore, is of no less importance than market expansion for an
MNO. To further examine and quantify the financial and market-related impact of discount and telecom MVNOs on their hosting MNOs, we employ a quasi-experimental
design using a difference-in-differences (DID) embedded generalized random forest
(GRF) model as an extended analysis. The purpose of this analysis is to estimate
the average impact of discount and telecom MVNO launches and whether they would
interact with mobile network technologies.
Starting with a simple quasi-experimental design, we identify the treatment by
whether an MNO has launched a discount or telecom MVNO. We construct the
treatment indicator (T reat) as a binary variable coded as 1 for all MNOs that launch
a discount or telecom MVNO and 0 for all MNOs that launch no MVNOs within
our observed time range. In a similar fashion, the post-treatment indicator (P ost) is
coded as 1 for the 8 quarters after the MVNO launch and 0 for the 8 quarters before
the launch. Because MVNOs are launched in different quarters, it would be hard to
define the treatment periods in chronological order. We thus use a sliding-window
method to identify pre- and post-treatment periods (Dong et al. 2022). Specifically,
we adjust the chronological timeline to a timeline relative to MVNO launches, where
the quarter of an MVNO launch is coded as 0, and all other quarters are coded based
on this reference point. For example, if an MNO launched its MVNO in 2009Q2, we
code 2009Q2 as 0, 2009Q3 as 1, and 2009Q1 as -1.
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Next, we introduce the dependent variables. As we discussed earlier, discount
MVNOs may help their hosting MNOs garner more users, while telecom MVNOs
have the advantage of converting more profitable post-paid users. Thus, to measure
the profitability and market expansion of an MNO, we adopt total revenue (RV )
and total connections (CN ) as the two dependent variables, respectively. The DID
models we employ are as follows:

CNit = β0 + β1 T reati + β2 P ostit + β3 T reati ×P ostit + X it Γ + λi + µt + εit (2.10)
RVit = β0 + β1 T reati + β2 P ostit + β3 T reati ×P ostit + X it Γ + λi + µt + εit (2.11)
where i and t represent MNOs and quarter, respectively. T reati is the treatment
indicator of MNO i, which is DSi in the sample of discount MVNOs, T Li in the
sample of telecom MVNOs, and DS_T L in the sample of MNOs that launched
both discount and telecom MVNOs. The average treatment effect is shown by the
estimated coefficient of T reati ×P ostit . We also include MNO fixed effects (λi ) and
quarter-year fixed effects (µt ). Additionally, we control for a set of time-varying
variables (Z it ) on both MNO and market levels, which is the same set of control
variables used in the main analysis.
Since the treatment used for identification, i.e., MVNO launches, is not randomly
assigned, we will need to find the counterfactual for treated MNOs, where the selected control MNOs are comparable to the treated ones. To address this concern, we
employ the causal forest method, which is a variant of the GRF method proposed by
Athey et al. (2019). We adopt this method for the following reasons. First, traditional
matching methods (e.g., propensity score matching) are designed for estimating treatment effects. The GRF method, however, is capable of estimating individual-level
treatment effects, which allows us to make causal inferences at the MNO level and
study the heterogeneous treatment effects at a more granular level (Wager and Athey
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2018, Athey and Wager 2021). Second, traditional matching methods usually suffer
from the issue of model misspecification, which could lead to biased parameter estimates. The GRF method, however, could still be robust in most of the cases without
correct specification of the model and therefore outperform in pairing treated units
with comparable control units (Imbens and Athey 2021). Third, unlike traditional
matching methods, the non-parametric nature of GRF does not make any assumptions on the function form of covariates, which also helps provide a more accurate
prediction of conditional expectations (Hernán and Robins 2010). Lastly, the machine
learning nature of the causal forest method optimizes the balance between bias and
variance, which allows higher prediction accuracy when compared with traditional
estimation methods (Imbens and Rubin 2015).
Next, we briefly describe each step of the GRF operations.3 1) Following Wager
et al. (2014), we grow 10,000 trees in each forest, where each tree is grown with a
random subsample that contains 50% of the entire training examples. 2) We use
the forest created above to make out-of-bag predictions. Notably, we calculate a
coefficient weight to measure the similarity between each training example that falls
into the same leaf. 3) The treatment effects then are calculated from these weight
coefficients. In our case, we examine the treatment effects (τ ) of MVNO launches in
total connections and revenue by:
τ

CN



(x) = E

(0)
CNi



(0)

τ RV (x) = E RVi

−

(1)
CNi |Xi

(1)



=x

− RVi |Xi = x

(2.12)



(2.13)

where Xi denotes the covariates. E(·) denotes the expected outcome, which, in our
case, is the embedded DID model of Equations (A.2) and (A.3). We report the estimation results of Equations (2.12) and (2.13) in Table 2.8. As shown in Table 2.8
Models 1 and 3, we find positive and significant treatment effects from launching dis3

For technical details, we refer the readers to Athey et al. (2019), Athey and Wager (2019, 2021).
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count MVNO only (τbCN = 0.052, p < 0.001) and both discount and telecom MVNOs
(τbCN = 0.023, p < 0.001). Thus, discount MVNO increases the total connections of
the host MNO by 5.34%, greater than the only 2.33% identified when it is offered with
telecom MVNO.4 In Model 6 of Table 2.8, we find positive and significant treatment
effects from launching both discount and telecom MVNOs (τbRV = 0.086, p < 0.001),
indicating that the combination of discount and telecom MVNOs leads to a greater
revenue gain of 8.98%. Interestingly, Model 4 shows that launching discount MVNO
alone may backfire (τbRV = −0.029, p < 0.001), where it reduces the total revenue of
its MNO by 2.94%.

4
Because the total connections (CN ) and total revenue (RV ) are log-transformed, we interpret
the estimated coefficients in semi-elasticities. For example, in Table 2.4 Model 1, the estimated
treatment effect is converted as e0.052 − 1 = 5.34%
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Table 2.8 Average Treatment Effects on Total Connections and Revenue using Generalized Random Forest Method
D.V.: Total Connections (CN )
Treatment
ATT (τb)
Control
Quarter FE
MNO FE
# of MNOs
Observations

D.V.: Total Revenue (RV )

(1)
DS

(2)
TL

(3)
DS_TL

(4)
DS

(5)
TL

(6)
DS_TL

0.052***
(0.014)
Y
Y
Y
102
1372

0.032
(0.044)
Y
Y
Y
44
636

0.023***
(0.04)
Y
Y
Y
102
1402

-0.029*
(0.014)
Y
Y
Y
102
1070

0.011†
(0.006)
Y
Y
Y
44
508

0.086***
(0.012)
Y
Y
Y
102
1093
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Notes: Models 1, 2, and 3 report the estimated coefficient values and robust standard errors (in parentheses) of Equation (2.12)
with the DS, TL, and DS_TL samples, respectively. Models 4, 5, and 6 report the estimated coefficient values and robust
standard errors (in parentheses) of Equation (2.13) with the DS, TL, and DS_TL samples, respectively. ATT denotes average
treatment effects on the treated samples.
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1.

Telecom MVNOs bundle mobile services with internet and cable services, which
gain a greater level of synergy when mobile services are based on a more advanced mobile network technology. This suggests that the treatment effects of telecom MVNO
are likely to be heterogeneous depending on the mobile technologies. Luckily, the
GRF method that we have adopted estimates the treatment effect for each MNO,
and therefore allows us to examine the distribution of individual treatment effects
and explore the heterogeneity in treatment effects across different technologies. We
conduct this test by using a categorical variable of mobile network technology (T ech),
which is coded as 0 for 2G, 1 for 3G, and 2 for 4G. To study how the MVNO launches
variously impact the different technology markets, we estimate the following regression model:5

τbiCN = β0 + β1 T echi + X it Γ + λi + µt + εit

(2.14)

where τbCN is the GRF estimated treatment effect on the total connections of MNO i.
Our coefficient of interest is β1 , which captures the differential treatment effects on 3G
and 4G, where 2G is used as the reference group. In Table 2.9, we find some interesting
results in the 4G market: discount and telecom MVNOs achieve a higher level of
synergy in the 4G market (β = 0.031, p < 0.001) when compared with the 2G market,
while discount MVNOs underperform in the 4G market (β = −0.017, p < 0.01) when
compared with the 2G market.
Overall, these findings further deepen our main results by exploring the underlying
mechanism of the two MVNO types in the funnel business model. As a result, this
section of extended analysis offers insights on why the combination of discount and
telecom MVNOs achieves better performance. We discuss the implications of the
results in the next section.
5

Note that we are not able to test the heterogeneous effect for revenue because MNOs rarely
report their revenue breakdown by different mobile network technologies.
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Table 2.9 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects of Discount and Telecom MVNOs on
Total Connections
D.V.: τbCN
Treatment
T ech
- 3G
- 4G
Control
Quarter FE
MNO FE
# of MNOs
Observations

(1)
DS

(2)
TL

(3)
DS_TL

-0.013
(0.024)
-0.017**
(0.002)
Y
Y
Y
102
1372

0.102
(0.124)
0.024
(0.117)
Y
Y
Y
44
636

0.019
(0.082)
0.031***
(0.007)
Y
Y
Y
102
1402

Notes: Models 1 and 2 report the estimated coefficient values and robust standard errors (in parentheses) of Equations (2.3) and (2.4), respectively. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1.

2.6

Discussion and Conclusion

The funnel business model has gained popularity within not only the telecommunication industry but also other industries, such as high tech industries. For example,
Dropbox offers a basic version free of charge with a limited online storage space with
the expectation that the captive subscribers will later on switch to the paid advanced
plan, which offers unlimited online storage space and 24-hour online assistance. With
similar logic, MNOs in the telecommunication market offer basic and more affordable
prepaid service plans to cost-sensitive subscribers. As their needs evolve, the current
pre-paid customers are expected to upgrade to advanced and more lucrative post-paid
service plans. Thus, the strategic role of pre-paid and post-paid plans becomes obvious in the funnel business model of MNOs: pre-paid plans are used to acquire new
customers, while post-paid plans are designed to retain existing customers. We thus
posit the funnel business model of MNOs on the theory of customer acquisition and
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retention. Previous studies show that the balance between customer acquisition and
retention is crucial for firms’ market performance (Bhardwaj 2001, Lal 1986, Mishra
and Prasad 2004, 2005). However, the existing literature has mostly focused on this
issue in the setting of direct selling and overlooked the setting of delegation (Dong
et al. 2011).
We address this literature gap by investigating the role of delegation in customer
acquisition and retention by leveraging the unique empirical setting of MVNOs in
the telecommunication industry. We find that discount MVNOs, though aiding the
market expansion of their hosting MNOs, intensify price competition in the market
because discount MVNOs usually offer service plans at budget prices. As a result,
customers may keep searching for better prices in the market, which creates hurdles for the interval of conversion from pre-paid to post-paid plans. Further, the
increased price competition triggered by the adoption of discount MVNOs could be
mitigated by telecom MVNOs, since telecom MVNOs differentiate their service plans
from price competition by offering long-term contracts with bundled fixed-line services (Prince and Greenstein 2014). As a result, the increased switching costs from
service contracts help smooth post-paid conversion and thus better retain customers.
More importantly, we find that the synergy between discount and telecom MVNOs
is stronger in the market of more advanced mobile network technologies, such as 4G
technology. This may be because 4G carries a greater level of functional compatibility
with fixed-line services (e.g., 4G’s video streaming capability and cable operators’ TV
services) compared with previous generations of mobile technologies.
To further examine the underlying mechanism of discount and telecom MVNOs
in the funnel business model, we extend our analysis to explore the impact of MVNO
launches on the total connections and revenue of their hosting MNOs by using a
quasi-experimental design. We discover the following interesting findings. 1) Adopting discount MVNOs only significantly contributes to the market expansion of their
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hosting MNOs, while it may hurt the revenue due to the lower price offered. This is
consistent with our finding with the structural estimation in the main analysis, where
the budget service plans offered by discount MVNOs intensify price competition on
the market. As a result, the adoption of a discount MVNO negatively impacts the
revenue of its hosting MNO due to price competition. 2) Though it leads to a small
gain in revenue, adopting telecom MVNOs does not help the market expansion of
the hosting MNO. This is consistent with the “conversion catalyst” role that telecom
MVNOs are expected to provide in the funnel business model, where they facilitate the
subscriber switch from affordable pre-paid plans to more profitable post-paid plans.
3) When coupled with telecom MVNOs, the negative effect of discount MVNOs on
revenue could be reversed to positive. This is also consistent with the findings in
the main results, that, given the adoption of discount MVNOs, partnering with telecom MVNOs could mitigate the price competition triggered by the discount MVNOs.
This is because, by leveraging their service bundles, telecom MVNOs differentiate the
market from the mud wrestling of price competition. Additionally, the combination
helps market expansion through the funnel business model, which is particularly effective in the 4G market due to technology synergy between the functionality of 4G
and fixed-line services.
Our research makes the following contributions. First, MVNOs play a key role
in customer acquisition and retention. The literature, however, is sparse on the role
of MVNOs in the market performance of MNOs. As a rising power in the telecommunication industry, MVNOs can help their hosting MNOs garner more pre-paid
subscribers and, later on, convert and retain them as post-paid subscribers. We contribute to the literature by establishing the role and the impact of MVNOs in the
funnel business model, which MNOs adopt for customer acquisition and retention.
Second, our study also makes a theoretical contribution to the existing literature.
Previous studies on customer acquisition and retention mostly focus on this issue in
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the setting of direct selling (Bhardwaj 2001, Lal 1986, Mishra and Prasad 2004, 2005).
As the market evolves, customers demand more specialized and customized services,
such that partnering with third-party companies with complementary resources becomes a desirable choice for firms. Thus, we contribute to the literature by extending
the understanding of customer acquisition and retention in the setting of delegation.
Discount and telecom MVNOs in the telecommunication market provide the perfect
research setting for this.
We provide useful implications for managers and policy makers regarding the
adoption of MVNOs. First, for MNO managers, instead of partnering with a discount or telecom MVNO alone, the combination of the two should be considered in
market strategy planning, especially in the case that an MNO tries to expand to a
more advanced technology market. Second, policy makers should be aware of the
increasingly important role of MVNOs in the telecommunication market and include
them in the monitoring of the market analysis. Additionally, policy makers should
encourage MVNO entry and facilitate the cooperation between MNOs and cable
companies, which would create more value for customers instead of price competition
between MNOs. These practical implications are not limited to the telecommunication industry, but can also be applied to other high tech industries. For example,
the cloud storage industry has adopted the "Freemium" strategy (i.e., offering a free
basic plan that can lock in the subscriber to a paid plan as their needs evolve), which
is very similar to the funnel business model. Thus, our underscoring of delegation in
customer acquisition and retention can be extended to such settings as well.
Our dataset is limited to firm-level information without user account details that
would allow us to measure subscriber switching behavior directly. Additionally, most
of the MNOs do not report churn rate. Even for those who do report it, we have no
information on whether a subscriber switches within the MNO or to another MNO.
When user level data becomes available, further research could directly test switching
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behavior on a more granular level. In addition, more recent telecom MVNOs are
slightly different from those that operated in our data coverage. Some newer telecom
MVNOs operate in a hybrid format in the sense that they do not fully rely on the
infrastructures of their hosting MNOs. For example, Spectrum Mobile utilizes its own
wifi hotspots to speed-up and off-load the cellular network of their MVNO subscribers.
Future research could further test if our findings still hold in the case of newer hybrid
telecom MVNOs.
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Chapter 3
Conclusion
This dissertation investigates the impact of mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs)
on the market expansion of their hosting mobile network operators (MNOs) and
the customer demand of the mobile market. The landscape of the telecommunication market is rapidly shifting. MVNOs have become the fastest growing point
in the telecommunication market and account for 7.4% of the global market (Research&Markets 2017). MVNOs in some European countries command as much as
15% to 20% of the total mobile market (Telecom.com 2018). As 5G is being rolled
out, MVNOs are expected to play a critical role in the advanced network slicing capability enabled by 5G, further empowering MVNOs’ operation flexibility (Grimaldo
2019).
By leveraging the proprietary data set collected from a research company specialized in the telecommunication industry, Chapter 2 of this dissertation reveals the
impact of MVNO launches on the market expansion of the hosting MNOs. Our finding suggests that, for the existing technology market, launching either a branded or
a third-party MVNO would increase the market share of the hosting MNO. Interestingly, the impact of a branded MVNO launch tends to decrease over time, while the
impact of a third-party MVNO launch exhibits an increasing pattern. For the new
technology market, we find that launching a branded MVNO increases the market
share of the hosting MNO, which diminishes with market maturity over time. This
research also provides valuable insights for managers and policymakers on how to
design and regulate risky and highly costly value chains with ever-changing technolo-
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gies. Particularly, the arrival of 5G technology grants greater importance to MVNOs
in future telecommunication markets (Grimaldo 2019). Managers need to become
fully aware of the trade-off between delegation and centralization when they reach
out to expand markets with different generations of technology.
Motivated by the recent rapid growth of telecom MVNOs, Chapter 3 of this
dissertation examines the impact of MVNOs on the market demand of the MNOs
using structural models. We find that though lowered prices offered by discount
MVNOs help the market expansion of MNOs, it also triggers the price competition in
the market. Conversely, telecom MVNOs, which differentiate the market by bundling
mobile services with fixed-line services and thus can be adopted to mitigate the price
competition in the market. The combination of the two MVNOs further facilitates the
funnel business model of MNOs, where discount MVNOs attract more subscribers on
the pre-paid market and telecom MVNOs, later on, convert these captive subscribers
to post-paid plans. Moreover, the synergy between discount and telecom MVNOs
is more prominent in advanced mobile technologies (e.g., 4G technology). In the
extended analysis, we also find that the combination of discount and telecom MVNOs
not only reduces price competition in the market but also increases the profitability
of the hosting MNO. Our findings suggest that MVNOs play a critical role in the
telecommunication market. Instead of being offered separately, discount and telecom
MVNOs should be offered jointly for the success of an MNO in customer acquisition
and retention, especially in the case that an MNO tries to expand to a more advanced
technology market.
Taken together, the findings from this dissertation provide considerable evidence
for the significant role of MVNOs in various aspects of the telecommunication market.
Specifically, this dissertation investigates MVNOs by their ownership (i.e., branded
and third-party) and by market positioning (i.e., telecom and discount). More im-
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portantly, the two studies are conducted on the basis of mobile network technologies
to shed light on the role of MVNOs in the upcoming 5G era.
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Appendix A
Chapter 2 Appendices
A.1

Exploratory DID Models

In this section, we explain how we use a sliding-window-adjusted difference-in-differences
(DID) model as an exploratory analysis. Specifically, we first introduce the identification of treatment and control groups, followed by propensity score matching and
sliding window adjustment. Then, we construct a DID model to estimate the impact
of MVNO launches on MNO market shares.
We explain the identification of treatment and control groups by introducing the
key treatment indicators. We create two treatment indicators for launches of branded
(Branded) and third-party (T hirdp) MVNOs, respectively. Branded (T hirdp) is
coded as 1 for all MNOs that launch branded (third-party) MVNOs and 0 for all
MNOs that launched no MVNOs within our observed time range, regardless of ownership. The post-treatment indicator (Af ter) is coded as 1 for quarters after an
MVNO launch and 0 for quarters before an MVNO launch. Next, we introduce the
dependent variables in the DID model. Since our data cover as many as 178 countries
across the world, using an absolute measure of MNO market performance would bias
our results because market sizes differ largely between countries. Thus, we employ
two proportional measures, the market shares of 2G and 3G services (M S_2g and
M S_3g), as our dependent variables to measure the performance of MNOs in the existing and new mobile network technology market, respectively (Bayus and Putsis Jr
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1999). 2G and 3G market shares are calculated as:
Con_2git
Con_3git
M S_2git = Pni
and M S_3git = Pni
i=1 Con_2git
i=1 Con_3git

(A.1)

where Con_2git and Con_3git are the total number of subscribers on the 2G and 3G
mobile networks of MNO i at quarter t. Given MNO i operates in a country that has
a total number of ni MNOs,

Pni

i=1

Con_2git and

Pni

i=1

Con_3git represent the total

number of 2G and 3G subscribers in the country that MNO i is affiliated with. Using
market shares as the dependent variable would be inappropriate if a country has a
small number of MNOs because monopoly or oligarchy could result in the extreme
value of market shares. For this reason, we keep MNOs in the countries that have at
lease three MNOs. Following previous studies, we test alternative measures to correct
the potential bias caused by the “sum-to-one" property of market shares. The results
remain consistent with our main results (see Appendix A.2 for details).
We also include several control variables in the DID analysis. First, we include
market-level controls that may potentially affect an MNO’s decision to launch an
MVNO. Specifically, we include gross domestic product per capita (GDP P C) as
a proxy for demand in a selected country. Second, since the decision to launch
an MVNO could also be affected by market competition, we include a total net
market share addition (M SA_tot) to control the competition competency in a specific
market. M SA_tot is measured by the quarter-by-quarter total subscriber additions
of an MNO divided by the total new subscriber additions in a market, where MNOs
with higher market share additions are likely more competitive. Last, we include
average revenue per user (ARP U _tot) as a proxy for the financial status of an MNO,
which is measured by total revenue divided by total number of MNO subscribers.
A higher ARPU indicates the better financial performance of an MNO (Dong et al.
2018). Additionally, to further address the unobserved heterogeneity of MNOs, we

93

control for MNO fixed effects. We specify the regression models as follows:
M Sit = β0 +β1 Brandedi +β2 Af terit +β3 Brandedi ×Af terit +Z it Γ+M i +εit (A.2)
M Sit = β0 + β1 T hirdpi + β2 Af terit + β3 T hirdpi × Af terit + Z it Γ + M i + εit (A.3)
where i and t denote MNOs and time periods, respectively. M Sit is a vector that
includes 2G and 3G market shares of MNO i at quarter t. Brandedi and T hirdpi are
the binary variables that indicate if MNO i is treated. Af terit represents whether
time period t is in the post-treatment period. We access the average treatment effect
through β3 , which is the estimated coefficient of Brandedi × Af terit and T hirdpi ×
Af tert . Z it is a vector of the control variables, which includes gross domestic product
per capita (GDP P C), net market share addition (M SA_tot), and average revenue
per user (ARP U _tot). M i is a vector of MNO fixed effects, which includes MNOlevel dummies.
Next, we conduct propensity score matching to pair treated MNOs with comparable MNOs in the candidate control group. To ensure that treated MNOs and
matched control MNOs are comparable, we calculate propensity scores based on various characteristics of MNOs, which include total market share, 2G market share,
total market penetration, and GDP. We discuss more detail in Section 4.1. Since the
MVNO launches do not take place in the same time period, we employ a slidingwindow method to identify pre- and post-treatment periods for the matched MNOs
in the control group (Dong et al. 2018, Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985). First, for each
quarter, we use the average value of the matching variables in the previous 4 periods
as the current value of the matching covariates, because an MNO would likely consider its recent performance when deciding to launch an MVNO. We run a logistic
regression independently in each period to estimate the propensity score. Second, we
use nearest neighbor matching to pair each treated MNO to three untreated MNOs
with the closest propensity score. This ensures that our treatment group and con-
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trol group are comparable in terms of likelihood to launch an MVNO.1 Third, after
MNOs in the candidate control group are matched with treated MNOs, we apply
sliding-window adjustment by defining the pre- and post-treatment periods of each
MNO in the control group to be the same as those in the treated MNO that they
are matched with using nearest neighbor matching (Dong et al. 2018, Rishika and
Ramaprasad 2019, Berger et al. 2017).
After matching, we construct a sample for branded MVNOs with 18 MNOs in
the treatment group and 67 MNOs in the control group. Similarly, the sample for
third-party MVNOs consists of 15 MNOs in the treatment group and 54 MNOs in
the control group.
We then estimate the DID models (Equations A.2 and A.3) and present the estimation results in Table 1.1. In Table 1.1, Models 1 and 2 show the estimation
results of the branded MVNO sample by using Equation A.2. We find that launching branded MVNOs has a significant positive effect on both the 2G market share
(β = 0.013, p < 0.05) and the 3G market share (β = 0.062, p < 0.01) of the hosting
MNOs. Models 3 and 4 in Table 1.1 show the estimation results for the third-party
MVNO sample by using Equation A.3. We find that launching third-party MVNOs
has a significant positive effect on the 2G market share (β = 0.016, p < 0.001) of the
hosting MNOs. However, we do not find such a significant effect on the 3G market
share.
In summary, launches of both branded and third-party MVNOs increase the 2G
market share of the hosting MNOs. In contrast, only branded MVNO launches have
a positive effect on the 3G market share of the hosting MNOs. The DID method
adopted here, however, measures only the average treatment effect across all MVNO
launches in different years. Nevertheless, we believe that a possible trend in treatment
effects exists, made visible as 2G and 3G technologies have become widely adopted in
1

We also tried different matching ratios, and the results are highly consistent.
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the market. Thus, we employ a more appropriate methodology, which quantifies the
impact of MVNO launches for each year and therefore allows us to capture changes
in treatment effects over time.
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A.2

Measure of Market Shares

In this section, we test alternative measures of market shares. Morais et al. (2016) reviewed various treatments using share variable as the dependent variable, from which
we adopt two models, i.e., additive log-ratio (ALR) transformation and centered logratio (CLR) transformation, because they have been previously applied in a context
comparable to our study (Wang et al. 2016). ALR transformation selects a base subject and transforms other subjects based on it. Thus, it eliminates “sum-to-one” and
reduces bias. We calculate the market share with ALR transformation as:


M S_alrit = log

M Si
where i ̸= k
M Sk


where M Sk denotes the market share of selected base subject k. Since ALR transformation requires one subject to be in the position of the base subject, the analysis
will naturally lose one subject and potentially reduce the estimation accuracy. CLR
transformation solves this issue by using the geometry mean in the transformation,
which does not require a base subject:
!

M Si
M S_clrit = log
where i ∈ k
g (M SD )
where M SD is the geometry mean of all market share values (D) in the sample.
Though keeping the original sample size in the analysis, CLR transformation results
in inferior performance in terms of reducing the correlation between the share values.
Given both pros and cons of the two methods, we apply them to our dependent
variable and replicate the estimation results of our DID models. Though the scale of
the results changed due to the log-transformation, the results after ALR and CLR
remain qualitatively consistent with the results before transformation (see Table A.1
and A.2 in this document).
Additionally, we test the log-transformation of market share, which has been
popularly used in recent marketing publications as a dependent variable to reduce
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bias (e.g., Ailawadi et al. 2008, Steenkamp and Geyskens 2014). The alternative
measure is calculated as M S_logit = log(M Sit ). Again, we find consistent results
with our main analysis (see Table A.3 in this document).
Table A.1 The DID Estimation with Additive Log-Ratio Transformation (ALR) of
Market Share

Dependent Variable
After
Branded×After

Branded MVNO
Model 1
Model 2
MS_2g_clr
MS_3g_clr
0.019
(0.020)
0.057†
(0.032)

-0.035
(0.037)
0.201**
(0.067)

Thirdp×After
Controls
MNO Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

Y
Y
366
0.982

Y
Y
211
0.940

Third-party MVNO
Model 3
Model 4
MS_2g_clr
MS_3g_clr
-0.141***
(0.032)

-0.046
(0.041)

0.233***
(0.046)
Y
Y
220
0.986

0.033
(0.058)
Y
Y
115
0.979

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1. Note the linear
terms of treatment group indicators (Branded and T hirdp) are omitted due to the MNO level fixed effects.
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Table A.2 The DID Estimation with Centered Log-Ratio Transformation (CLR) of
Market Share

Dependent Variable
After
Branded×After

Branded MVNO
Model 1
Model 2
MS_2g_alr
MS_3g_alr
-0.016
(0.034)
0.113
(0.112)

0.138
(0.091)
0.126*
(0.059)

Thirdp×After
Controls
MNO Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

Y
Y
362
0.920

Y
Y
211
0.844

Third-party MVNO
Model 3
Model 4
MS_2g_alr
MS_3g_alr
-0.092*
(0.037)

0.088
(0.088)

0.208***
(0.062)
Y
Y
220
0.945

-0.121
(0.088)
Y
Y
115
0.924

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1. Note the linear
terms of treatment group indicators (Branded and T hirdp) are omitted due to the MNO level fixed effects.

Table A.3 The DID Estimation with Centered Log-Ratio Transformation (CLR) of
Market Share

Dependent Variable
After
Branded×After

Branded MVNO
Model 1
Model 2
MS_2g_log
MS_3g_log
0.007
(0.019)
0.041
(0.028)

-0.102**
(0.035)
0.172**
(0.058)

Thirdp×After
Controls
MNO Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

Y
Y
362
0.920

Y
Y
211
0.844

Third-party MVNO
Model 3
Model 4
MS_2g_log
MS_3g_log
-0.139***
(0.032)

-0.044
(0.032)

0.220***
(0.045)
Y
Y
220
0.945

0.007
(0.038)
Y
Y
115
0.924

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1. Note the linear
terms of treatment group indicators (Branded and T hirdp) are omitted due to the MNO level fixed effects.
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A.3

Matching Quality Checks for dPSM

To ensure matching quality, we further check for substantial differences between treatment and control groups by testing the covariates balance in the pre-treatment period. We test the samples constructed for branded MVNOs and third-party MVNOs
separately. In order to test the differences between the two groups, we follow the
matching bias estimation method proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). The
standardized differences between the treatment and control groups (d¯j ) are calculated
as d¯j = (x̄ti − x̄ci )

r

s2ti +s2ci
2

!− 1
2

, where x̄ti and x̄ci are the sample means of covari-

ate i of the treatment and control groups, respectively. sti and sci are the standard
deviations of covariate i of the treatment and control groups, respectively. The bias
¯ is calculated as d¯ = 1 − |d¯¯1 | , where d¯1 and d¯0 are the standardized biases
reduction (d)
|d0 |
before and after propensity score matching, respectively. The results are provided in
Table A.4, in which we can observe that, when testing the difference between treatment and candidate control groups, the t-statistics are significant. The t-statistics,
however, become insignificant when testing the difference between treatment and
matched control groups. This suggests that our matching algorithm significantly reduces the bias between treatment and control groups. It is particularly noteworthy
that the average standardized bias reduction is 38.63% for the branded sample and
62.12% for the third-party sample, signifying the effectiveness of this approach in
achieving an adequate balance between treatment and control groups.
Second, we plot three propensity score distributions to visually inspect whether
our matching has significantly reduced bias. The three distributions are the propensity score distributions of the treatment group, candidate control group, and matched
control group (Rishika and Ramaprasad 2019), presented in Figure A.1. Figure A.1
Panel (a) shows that, compared to the candidate control group, the propensity score
distribution of the matched control group is closer to that of the treatment group.
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Table A.4 Differences in Characteristics of Treatment and Control Groups Before
and After Propensity Score Matching
Treatment
Group
Variable

Mean

Control Group
Before Matching
Mean

Con_tot
MP_tot
MS_tot
MS_2g

6.67
0.27
0.31
0.32

5.31
0.19
0.27
0.28

Con_tot
MP_tot
MS_tot
MS_2g

9.51
0.22
0.21
0.25

5.31
0.19
0.27
0.28

t-statisitic

After Matching
Mean

Branded Sample
-0.34
6.33
-2.31
0.30
-1.06
0.29
-0.90
0.31
Third-party Sample
-1.26
5.83
-1.12
0.26
1.57
0.26
0.93
0.00

Standardized Bias

t-statisitic

Reduction (%)

-0.31
-0.20
-0.89
-0.59

41.55%
94.59%
12.72%
5.67%

1.35
0.08
0.26
-0.43

9.72%
92.57%
84.84%
61.36%

Notes: This table shows the differences of the matching variables of the treatment and control groups both before
and after matching. The t-statistics reported in the table are drawn from the t-test of the difference between
the two groups. The last column shows the percentage reduction in standardized bias achieved after matching
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985).

Figure A.1 Panel (b) shows that the range of propensity scores for the treatment and
matched control groups are nearly identical. Additionally, outliers in the propensity scores of the candidate control groups are excluded after matching. The differences between the matching covariates are significantly reduced after propensity
score matching is employed, suggesting that our matching procedure has significantly
reduced bias.

A.4

Robustness Tests for dPSM: Identification

A.4.1

Covariates Balance Check

A.4.2

Parallel Assumption Check

Following Autor (2003), Dhanorkar (2019), and Chu et al. (2021), we perform the parallel trends test by adding period dummies and their interaction with the treatment
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Notes: T denotes the treatment group, CC denotes the candidate control group before matching, and C denotes the
matched control group. The two figures show the distributions of estimated propensity scores of the three groups
in a branded MVNO sample and third-party MVNO sample, respectively. From the figures, we can see that after
our matching, the treated group and control group are comparable to each other in both ownership structures.

Figure A.1 Propensity Score Distributions for the Treatment, Candidate Control,
and Matched Control Groups
Table A.5 Covariates Balance Check for the Exploratory Analysis
Mean (Treated)
MP_tot
Con_tot
MS_tot
MS_2g
GDP

0.261
0.004
0.321
0.322
25.413

MP_tot
Con_tot
MS_tot
MS_2g
GDP

0.248
0.002
0.285
0.285
24.701

Mean Control

Difference

Branded Sample
0.259
-0.002
0.003
-0.001
0.361
0.040
0.358
0.036
24.995
-0.417
Third-party Sample
0.263
0.015
0.002
-0.001
0.301
0.016
0.301
0.016
24.420
-0.281

t-statistics

P r(|T | > |t|)

-0.062
-0.733
1.097
1.013
-1.626

0.951
0.464
0.274
0.312
0.105

0.391
-0.853
0.369
0.375
-0.899

0.696
0.394
0.713
0.708
0.370

Notes: GDP is logarithm transformed; Conn_tot is scaled by 10−9 .

indicator to the regression:
Yit = αT reati +

4
X
t−4

βt P eriodt +

4
X

γt T reati ×P eriodt + λi + µt + Z it Γ + εit

t−4

where T reati denotes the treatment indicator. λi and µt denote MNO and time fixed
effects, respectively. P eriodt indicates relative time to treatment, where, for a given
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j periods till the MVNO launch, P eriodt is coded as 1 for period j and 0 otherwise.
The launching period (t = 0) is set as the baseline group. We plot the estimated
coefficients and confidence interval of γt in Figure A.2. In Figure A.2, the estimated
coefficients of the “leads” (γ−4 ) to (γ−1 ) are insignificant (left-hand side of middle
line in each panel), which suggests that there is no significant difference between the
treatment and control group identified in each quarter of the pre-treatment periods.
The results reassure that the treatment group and the matched control group satisfy
the parallel trends assumption.

Notes. The vertical brands span a 95% confidence interval

Figure A.2 The Effects Across Periods of MVNO Launches

A.4.3

Reverse Causality Check

Although the propensity score matching should substantially reduce the likelihood
of reverse causality, we conduct additional analysis to test if it exists. First, following Dhanorkar (2019), we estimate an MVNO adoption model to test for potential
reverse causality, i.e., whether the adoption of MVNOs was driven by the previous
performance of the hosting MNO. Table A.6 shows the results for Cox proportional
hazard models that predict an MNO’s decision to adopt an MVNO as a function of
2G and 3G market shares. We also include other independent variables to capture
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the performance of MNOs in other aspects. In Table A.6, we find the estimated coefficients are not significant, suggesting that there is no significant evidence of reverse
causality.
Table A.6 Hazard Models for MVNO Launches’ Exogeneity

Dependent Variable
MS_2g

Model 1
Model 2
Branded MVNO

Model 3
Model 4
Third-party MVNO

7.488
(6.375)

0.869
(6.185)

MS_3g
Controls
Conn_tot
MP_tot
MS_tot
GDP
Pop_tot
Observations

0.101
(0.670)
16.088
(18.448)
1.793
(1.142)
-9.000
(6.367)
-0.003
(0.082)
0.000
(0.000)
213

-0.187
(18.313)
-0.235
(2.228)
-0.812
(2.552)
-0.064
(0.105)
0.000
(0.000)
114

4.515
(4.274)
10.450
(32.088)
0.119
(0.809)
-1.249
(6.406)
0.090
(0.099)
-0.000
(0.000)
173

112.952*
(50.370)
3.360
(2.245)
-9.942*
(4.786)
-0.627**
(0.241)
0.000
(0.000)
84

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1.
Note the linear terms of treatment group indicators (Branded and T hirdp) are omitted due to
the MNO level fixed effects.

Additionally, we have tested the model with one- and two-year lags of all independent variables. We present the one- and two-year lag results in Tables A.7 and
A.8 in this document. The results are highly consistent with the DID results in the
explorative analysis, which further validates that MVNO launching precedes market
share increases and thus reverse causality should not be a concern.
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Table A.7 The DID Estimation with One-year Lag of the Independent Variables

Dependent Variable
After
Branded×After

Branded MVNO
Model 1
Model 2
MS_2g
MS_3g

Third-party MVNO
Model 3
Model 4
MS_2g
MS_3g

-0.013**
(0.004)
0.014*
(0.006)

-0.013***
(0.004)

-0.014
(0.009)

0.014***
(0.004)
Y
Y
195
0.998

-0.000
(0.011)
Y
Y
103
0.988

-0.084***
(0.018)
0.068**
(0.021)

Thirdp×After
Controls
MNO Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

Y
Y
329
0.987

Y
Y
194
0.959

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1.
Note the linear terms of treatment group indicators (Branded and T hirdp) are omitted due to the
MNO level fixed effects.

Table A.8 The DID Estimation with Two-year Lag of the Independent Variables

Dependent Variable
After
Branded×After

Branded MVNO
Model 1
Model 2
MS_2g
MS_3g

Third-party MVNO
Model 3
Model 4
MS_2g
MS_3g

-0.010**
(0.004)
0.021*
(0.008)

-0.012*
(0.005)

-0.022†
(0.011)

0.011*
(0.005)
Y
Y
170
0.998

0.001
(0.013)
Y
Y
91
0.990

-0.073***
(0.019)
0.066**
(0.022)

Thirdp×After
Controls
MNO Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

Y
Y
288
0.985

Y
Y
175
0.959

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1.
Note the linear terms of treatment group indicators (Branded and T hirdp) are omitted due to the
MNO level fixed effects.
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A.5
A.5.1

Robustness Tests for dPSM: Parameter Settings
Robustness Tests for the Identification of Treated and Control
Groups

Figure A.3 Robustness Tests for the Identification of Treated and Control Groups
(kt = 6 and kc = 6)
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A.5.2

Robustness Tests for Dynamic Propensity Score Matching

Figure A.4 Robustness Tests of Alternative Matching Variables and Matching Window (kp = 6)
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Figure A.5 Robustness Tests of Alternative Matching Method (NN2 and NN3)
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A.5.3

Robustness Tests for Measurement of Treatment Effect

Figure A.6 Robustness Tests for Measurement of Treatment Effect (ke = 6 and
ke = 8)

A.6

Trend Tests for the Estimated Results of dPSM

In this section, we test whether the trends in the dPSM results are statistically
supported (i.e., the increasing trend of treatment effects in Panel (c) of Figure 1.9
and the decreasing trend of treatment effects in Panel (b) of Figure 1.9). We regress
the values on the x-axis (years) with those on the y-axis (treatment effects) to see
if the slope would be statistically significant. We adopt a basic OLS regression and
use the estimated treatment effect and years as dependent and independent variables,
respectively.
τt = β0 + β1 Y eart + εit
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where τt represents the estimated treatment effects at Year t. Y eart represents the
number of the current year. β1 is the estimated slope of interest, from which we can
see if there is a statistically significant trend in the estimated treatment effects. We
summarize the regression results of β1 from Panels (a), (b), (c), and (d) of Figure 1.9
in the table below:
Panel (a)

Panel (b)

-0.003†
(0.001)

-0.033*
(0.009)

Panel (c)

Panel (d)

0.006**
(0.001)

0.007
(0.007)

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p <
0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1..

From the regression results above, we observe that the decreasing trend we suggested in Panel (b) of Figure 1.9 is statistically supported (β = −0.033, p < 0.05), as
well as the increasing trend in Panel (c) of Figure 1.9 (β = 0.006, p < 0.01). Additionally, the decreasing trend in Panel (a) is marginally significant (β = −.003, p < 0.10).

A.7

Market Segments of Rural and Young Populations

In this section, we test the underlying mechanism, where MVNOs could be complementary assets to MNOs with a strong presence in specific geographic/demographic
groups. Specifically, we test how the treatment effects vary with a rural population,
which is a segment that is hard for MNOs to reach and thus with a greater need for
complementary recourse, as well as with a young population, which is a segment with
a greater switching propensity and carries higher risks.
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A.7.1

Rural Population

First, we test the role of a rural population in MVNOs’ impact on their hosting MNOs’
market share. The World Bank releases the average rural population percentage every
year in their report.2 We use the average rural population percentage in 2008, i.e.,
49.351%, because this year is in the middle of our data time span. We then create
a dummy variable (RuralP op) to capture the effect of rural population, where it is
coded as 1 for MNOs in countries that have more than 49.351% rural population and
0 otherwise. By adding the linear and interaction terms in the main DID models, we
test the following models:
M Sit =β0 + β1 T reatedi + β2 Af terit + β3 RuralP opit + β4 T reatedi ×Af terit
+ β5 T reatedi ×Af terit ×RuralP opit + Z it Γ + M i + εit
where T reati is the treatment indicator for branded or third-party samples (Branded
and T hirdp). Z it is a vector that contains the same set of control variables in
the main analysis. We present the estimation results in Table A.9 of this document. In Table A.9 Model 3, we find that the interaction between the treatment
indicator and post-treatment indicator (T reatedi ×Af terit ) is positive and significant (β = 0.008, p < 0.01), which indicates that launching third-party MVNOs in
countries with a lower proportion of rural population (RuralP op = 0) can increase
the 2G market share of the hosting MNOs. Additionally, the three-way interaction (T reatedi ×Af terit ×RuralP opit ) is also positive and significant (β = 0.008, p <
0.001), which indicates that launching third-party MVNOs in countries with greater
rural population proportions (RuralP op = 1) increases the 2G market shares of
MVNOs in a larger magnitude compared to launches in countries with smaller rural
population proportions (RuralP op = 0).
2

https://data.worldbank.org/
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Table A.9 The DID Estimation Results of Rural Population

Dependent Variable
After
RuralPop
Treat×After
Treat×After×RuralPop
Controls
MNO Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

Branded MVNO
Model 1
Model 2
MS_2g
MS_3g

Third-party MVNO
Model 3
Model 4
MS_2g
MS_3g

-0.013***
(0.003)
0.011*
(0.005)
0.011
(0.007)
-0.002
(0.007)
Y
Y
317
0.990

-0.008***
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.004)
0.008**
(0.003)
0.008*
(0.004)
Y
Y
220
0.998

-0.075***
(0.016)
0.061***
(0.010)
0.061**
(0.021)
-0.025
(0.016)
Y
Y
211
0.959

-0.002
(0.007)
-0.027
(0.018)
0.003
(0.010)
-0.029**
(0.009)
Y
Y
115
0.987

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1.
Note the linear terms of treatment group indicators (Branded and T hirdp) are omitted due to the
MNO level fixed effects.

A.7.2

Young Population

We then test the role of young populations in an MVNO’s impact on their hosting
MNO’s market share. Following Ahmad et al. (2019), we define the young population
mobile market segment as those aged 20-40. People in this age range are more
interested in the new development of mobile technologies and thus more likely to
become early adopters of 3G. On the other hand, people in this age range are usually
more price-sensitive and more likely to switch to a competitor. We use the average
percentage of young population in 2007, i.e., 31.103% as released by The World
Bank, and create the dummy variable (Y oungP op) accordingly (coded as 1 if above
the threshold and 0 otherwise). By adding the linear and interaction terms in the
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main DID models, we test the following models:
M Sit =β0 + β1 T reatedi + β2 Af terit + β3 Y oungP opit + β4 T reatedi ×Af terit
+ β5 T reatedi ×Af terit ×Y oungP opit + Z it Γ + M i + εit
We present the estimation results in Table A.10 of this document. In Table A.10
Model 2, we find that the interaction between the treatment indicator and posttreatment indicator (T reatedi ×Af terit ) is positive and significant (β = 0.067, p <
0.05), which indicates that launching third-party MVNOs in countries with a lower
proportion of young population (Y oungP op = 0) can increase the 3G market share of
the hosting MNOs. Additionally, the three-way interaction (T reatedi ×Af terit ×Y oungP opit )
is also positive and significant (β = 0.161, p < 0.001), which indicates that launching
third-party MVNOs in countries with greater young population proportions (Y oungP op =
1) increases the 3G market shares of MVNOs in a larger magnitude when compared
to the launches in countries with smaller young population proportions (Y oungP op =
0).
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Table A.10 The DID Estimation Results of Young Population

Dependent Variable
After
YoungPop
Treat×YoungPop
Treat×After×YoungPop
Control
MNO Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

Branded MVNO
Model 1
Model 2
MS_2g
MS_3g

Third-party MVNO
Model 3
Model 4
MS_2g
MS_3g

-0.013***
(0.003)
-0.004
(0.006)
0.064†
(0.036)
-0.060
(0.036)
Y
Y
317
0.991

-0.008***
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.010**
(0.003)
-0.004
(0.003)
Y
Y
220
0.998

-0.079***
(0.016)
-0.052**
(0.019)
0.067*
(0.030)
0.161***
(0.027)
Y
Y
211
0.966

-0.004
(0.007)
-0.031†
(0.017)
-0.002
(0.010)
0.014
(0.014)
Y
Y
115
0.986

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1.
Note the linear terms of treatment group indicators (Branded and T hirdp) are omitted due to the
MNO level fixed effects.
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Appendix B
Chapter 3 Appendices
Table B.1 Robustness Test of MNO-Level Fixed Effects: 2SLS Estimation with IV (DV: ln (sj ) − ln (s0 ) )
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VARIABLES

(1)
Nested by
Discount MVNO

(2)
Nested by
Telecom MVNO

(1)
Nested by
Technology

P rice(pi )
ln (sj|g )
MNO FE
Controls
Quarter FE
Observations

-0.092**
(0.034)
0.503***
(0.085)
Included
Included
Included
21,277

-0.066
(0.043)
0.288***
(0.085)
Included
Included
Included
1,261

-0.041***
(0.001)
0.250***
(0.056)
Included
Included
Included
21,277

Notes: Models 1, 2, and 3 report the estimated coefficient values and robust standard errors (in parentheses) of Equations (2.3), (2.4),
and (2.5) with MNO-level fixed effects. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1.

Table B.2 Robustness Test of Country-Level Fixed Effects: 2SLS Estimation with IV (DV: ln (sj ) − ln (s0 ) )
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VARIABLES

(1)
Nested by
Discount MVNO

(2)
Nested by
Telecom MVNO

(1)
Nested by
Technology

P rice(pi )
ln (sj|g )
Country FE
Controls
Quarter FE
Observations

-0.011*
(0.005)
0.942***
(0.004)
Included
Included
Included
21,277

-0.302***
(0.066)
0.887***
(0.049)
Included
Included
Included
1,261

-0.059***
(0.011)
0.790***
(0.010)
Included
Included
Included
21,277

Notes: Models 1, 2, and 3 report the estimated coefficient values and robust standard errors (in parentheses) of Equations (2.3), (2.4), and
(2.5) with country-level fixed effects. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1.

